Retracing some paths in categorical semantics: From
  process-propositions-as-types to categorified real numbers and monoidal
  computers by Pavlovic, Dusko
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
10
05
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  2
0 J
ul 
20
20
Retracing some paths in categorical semantics:
From process-propositions-as-types
to categorified real numbers and monoidal computers
Dusko Pavlovic∗
University of Hawaii, Honolulu HI
dusko@hawaii.edu
Abstract
The logical parallelism of propositional connectives and type constructors extends beyond
the static realm of predicates, to the dynamic realm of processes. Understanding the logical
parallelism of process propositions and dynamic types was one of the central problems of the
semantics of computation, albeit not always clear or explicit. It sprung into clarity through the
early work of Samson Abramsky, where the central ideas of denotational semantics and pro-
cess calculus were brought together and analyzed by categorical tools, e.g. in the structure of
interaction categories. While some logical structures borne of dynamics of computation im-
mediately started to emerge, others had to wait, be it because the underlying logical principles
(mainly those arising from coinduction) were not yet sufficiently well-understood, or simply
because the research community was more interested in other semantical tasks. Looking back,
it seems that the process logic uncovered by those early semantical efforts might still be start-
ing to emerge and that the vast field of results that have been obtained in the meantime might
be a valley on a tip of an iceberg.
In the present paper, I try to provide a logical overview of the gamut of interaction cate-
gories and to distinguish those that model computation from those that capture processes in
general. The main coinductive constructions turn out to be of this latter kind, as illustrated to-
wards the end of the paper by a compact category of all real numbers as processes, computable
and uncomputable, with polarized bisimulations as morphisms. The addition of the reals arises
as the biproduct, real vector spaces are the enriched bicompletions, and linear algebra arises
from the enriched kan extensions. At the final step, I sketch a structure that characterizes the
computable fragment of categorical semantics.
∗Supported by NSF and AFOSR.
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Personal introduction
I first learned about Samson Abramsky’s work from his invited plenary lecture at the International
Category Theory Meeting in Montreal in 1991. It was the golden age of category theory, and Mon-
treal was at the heart of it, and I got to be a postdoc there. Just a few years earlier, I was a dropout
freelance programmer, but had become a mathematician, and was uninterested in computers. I was
told, however, that Abramsky had constructed some categories that no one had seen before, so I
came to listen to his talk. I also had a talk to give later that day, but for some reason, I do not recall
how that went. At the end of Abramsky’s plenary lecture, Saunders Mac Lane stood up, one of the
two fathers of category theory, high up near the ceiling of the amphitheater, and spoke for a long
time. He criticized computer science in general. After that, Bill Lawvere stood up, and provided
some friendly comments, suggesting directions for progress and improvement.
Two years later, I became an ”EU Human Capital Mobility” fellow within the Theory Group,
led by Samson Abramsky at the Imperial College in London. I started learning computer science
and spent a lot of time trying to understand Samson’s interaction categories [3]. In the meantime,
he had constructed more categories that no one had seen before. My fellowship ended after a year
or two, and the human capital mobility turned out to be much greater than anyone could imagine,
but I continued to think about interaction categories for years. Here I try to summarize some of the
outcomes of that process.
1 Introduction: On categorical logics and propositions-as-types
The category of sets or types. This is a paper about categorical semantics. It is written for a
collection intended for logicians. If you are reading this, then you are presumed to be interested
in categorical logic, although you may not be interested in categories in general. To ease this
tension, I will avoid abstract categories, and mostly stick with the category S of sets and functions.
It is presented, however, as a universe of types, by specifying which type constructors are used
in each construction. Initially we just need the cartesian products, but later constructions require
more. Naive set theory used to be presented incrementally. Nowadays most mathematicians think
of types as sets, and most programmers think of sets as types, so it seems reasonable for logicians
and computer scientists to identify the two. To keep the naive-set-theory flavor, we usually call the
type inhabitants elements, where type theorists use the term terms.
When a set is constructed as a type, then it can also be construed as a proposition: its elements
are some constructions, and they can be viewed as proofs [64]. Such interpretations originate
from logic, where the idea of propositions-as-types was first traced along the path of proofs-as-
constructions [27, 49, 63]. We retrace these paths first, and proceed throughout with propositions-
as-types, types-as-sets, terms-as-elements, elements-as-morphisms [58, 56].
1.1 Logics of types
Bertrand Russell proposed his ramified theory of types [95] as a logical framework for paradox
prevention. Alonzo Church and Stephen Kleene advanced type theory into a model of computation
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[27, 48]. Dana Scott adopted type theory as the foundation for a mathematical approach to the
semantics of computation [96]. The semantics of programming languages were built steadily upon
that foundation [41, 93]. Process semantics also arose from that foundation [66], but had to undergo
a substantive conceptual evolution before the types could extend in time, and capture dynamics. I
followed these developments through Samson Abramsky’s work.
The propositions-as-types paradigm was discovered many times. In logic and computer sci-
ence, it is attributed to Haskell Curry and William Howard [97, 38, Ch. 3]. Howard got the idea
from Georg Kreisel [106], and Kreisel’s goal was to formalize Brouwer’s concept of proofs-as-
constructions [50]. An early formalization of Brouwer’s concept goes back to Kolmogorov [49].
The structural reason why propositions and types obey analogous laws was offered by Law-
vere [59], who pointed out that the propositional and the typing rules are instances of analogous
categorical adjunctions, and that the proof constructions and the term derivations arise from the
adjunction units and counits. This gave rise to the idea of categorical proof theory, pursued by
Lambek [52, 54, 55], and to the basic structures of categorical semantics, succinctly described in
[57, and the references therein]. In the preface to his seminal report [96], Dana Scott explained
that
”a category represents the ’algebra of types’, just as abstract rings give us the algebra
of polynomials, originally understood to concern only integers or rationals. One can of
course think only of particular type systems, but, for a full understanding, one needs
also to take into account the general theory of types, and especially translations or
interpretations of one system in another.”
Samson Abramsky spearheaded the efforts towards expanding the categorical semantics of pro-
gram abstraction, as formalized in type theory, and merge it with a categorical semantics of process
abstraction and interaction, as formalized in the theory of concurrency and process calculi. This
led to interaction categories [3, 28, 75, 77], specification structures [11, 87], and a step further
to geometry of interaction [13] and game semantics [5, 12, 14, 15, and many other publications].
As the realm of program abstraction expanded, e.g. into quantum computation and protocols, the
semantical apparatus also expanded [7, 8, 10], the tree branched [30, 82], some branches crossed1.
In the present paper, however, we are only concerned with the root.
1.2 Categorical proof theory
Proofs-as-constructions. The Curry-Howard isomorphism is one of the conceptual building
blocks of type theory, built deep into the foundation of computer science and functional program-
ming [38, ch. 3]. The fact that it is an isomorphism means that the type constructors on one side
obey the same laws as the propositional connectives on the other side; and these laws are expressed
as a bijection between the terms and the proofs.
1E.g., [81] used the methods of [87] to expand the models of [10].
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1.2.1 Entailments as morphisms
In categorical proof theory, logical sequents are treated as arrows in a category [52, 54, 55, 59].
The reflexivity and the transitivity of the entailment relation then correspond to the main categorical
structures: the identities and the composition.
A ⊢ A
1
S(A, A)
pidq (1)
A ⊢ B B ⊢ C
A ⊢ C
S(A, B) × S(B,C)
S(A,C)
(−;−)
But while there is at most one sequent A ⊢ B for given A and B, there can be many arrows between
A and B in a category. Categorical semantics of the logical entailment must therefore be imposed
by equations:
S(A, B) S(A, B)
S(A, A) × S(A, B) S(A, B) × S(B, B)
S(A, B) S(A, B)
id
〈pidq,id〉
id
〈id,pidq〉
(−;−) (−;−)
S(A, B) × S(B,C) × S(C,D) S(A, B) × S(B,D)
S(A,C) × S(C,D) S(A,D)
(−;−)×id
id×(−;−)
(−;−)
(−;−)
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1.2.2 Conjunction and disjunction as product and coproduct
Algebraically, the conjunction and the disjunction are the meet and the join in the proposition
lattice. Categorically, they are the product and the coproduct:
X ⊢ A X ⊢ B
=====================
X ⊢ A ∧ B
S(X, A) × S(X, B)
S(X, A × B)
p〈−,−〉q 〈πA◦−,πB◦−〉 (2)
A ⊢ X B ⊢ X
=====================
A ∨ B ⊢ X
S(A, X) × S(B, X)
S(A + B, X)
p[−,−]q 〈−◦ιA,−◦ιB〉 (3)
The difference between the algebraic and the categorical view, is that in the first case there is
at most one entailment X ⊢ A, whereas in the second case there can be many arrows X → A,
usually labelled, and viewed as functions in the category S. The mapping in (2) on the right up
establishes the bijection between the proofs or functions X → A × B and the pairs of proofs or
functions X → A and X → B. The proof transformations thus become function manipulations.
If the elements of sets, or entries of data types, are thought of as witnesses of the corresponding
propositions, then the data services, such as the logical operations on propositions realized by the
data services, such as copying or pairing of data entries. It often comes as a surprise that such
simple-minded analogies become effective tools in functional programming [86]. They also have
far-reaching logical consequences, some of which are pursued in this paper.
1.2.3 Logic of abstraction: Implication as exponent
The fact that the conjunction A ∧ (−) is the right adjoint to the implication A(−) [59] means that
the implication introduction and elimination can be expressed as the reversible rule on the left.
(A ∧ X) ⊢ B
============ ⊃
X ⊢ (A ⊃ B)
S(A × X, B)
S
(
X, (A⇒B))
(A⇒−)◦ηX εX◦(A×−) (4)
The reversibility of the logical rule on the right was the first example of the propositions-as-types
phenomenon, i.e. the first proof-as-term, noticed back in the 1930s by Haskell Curry. But while
the reversibility of the logical rule of the left captures the one-to-one correspondence of proofs, the
categorical adjunction on the right also captures the fact that the correspondence is natural with
respect to X, i.e. that it is preserved under all f ∈ S(X, Y), in the sense that the following square
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commutes.
S(A × Y, B) S(A × X, B)
S
(
Y, (A⇒B)) S(X, (A⇒B))
(A⇒−)◦ηY
−◦(A× f )
(A⇒−)◦ηXεY◦(A×−)
−◦ f
εX◦(A×−) (5)
In fact, there are two squares in this diagram: one formed by ηs, the other by εs. Their commu-
tativity formally establishes categorically that the correspondence is polymorphic, i.e. valid for
all X, and under all of its transformations. The same polymorphic correspondence is expressed
type-theoretically by the familiar conversion rules:
A × (A⇒ (A × X))
A × X A × X
εA×X
id
A×ηX
(
λa. f (a, x)
)
· b = f (b, x) (β)
A ⇒ X A ⇒ X
A ⇒ (A × (A⇒X))
id
η(A⇒X) (A⇒εX) λa.
(
g(x) · a
)
= g(x) (η)
where the function application ε : (A⇒B) × A −→ B is abbreviated to g · a = ε(g, a).
1.3 Modalities as monads and comonads
1.3.1 Possibility and side-effects
A possibility modality can be introduced by the rules on the left.
A ⊢ ^A
A ∧ B ⊢ ^C
^A ∧ ^B ⊢ ^C
S(A × B,MC)
S
(
MA × MB,MC)
# −◦ηA×B (6)
Each of the logical rules corresponds to one of the categorical transformations on the right, where
the mapping up is the precomposition A × B η−→ M(A × B) −→ MC, the mapping down is the
operation # lifting A×B M−→ C to MA×MB f
#
−→ MC, and the triple (M, η, #) is a monad [23, 57, 61,
62]2. If sequents are viewed as morphisms, or labelled, then the derivation rules on the left become
reversible by imposing the following equations on the operations on the right:
η#A = idMA f
# ◦ ηA×B = f ( f # ◦ t)# = f # ◦ t#
2The third component of the monad signature in the first three references is different from the one that we use
here, but equivalent if B is omitted. The present one, without the B component, originates from the fourth reference.
It is more convenient for programming and in type theory. The B component is a succenct way to also impose the
commutativity requirement on the monad. More in Sec. 1.4.
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The third equation defines the composition in the Kleisli category
|SM | = |S|
SM(A, B) = S(A,MB)
A morphism in the form A −→ MB can be thought of as a function that produces not just the outputs
of type B, but also some side-effects, modeled by the monad M. The idea that computations do
not just consume inputs and produce outputs, but also cause side-effects, that must be taken into
account in process theory, goes back to [66]. E.g., the fact that computations may not terminate
means that they implement functions in the form A −→ B⊥ where
(−)⊥ : S −→ S (7)
X 7→ X ∪ {⊥}
where ⊥ is a fresh element, denoting the divergence. This is the maybe monad. The category S⊥
is easily seen to be equivalent to the category of sets and partial functions.
Some computations may depend on the states of the computer, which may depend on the envi-
ronment. Running the same program on the same inputs of type may therefore produce different
outputs at different times, for no unobservable reason. Such computations implement functions in
the form A −→ ℘B from elements of A to sets of elements of B. The type constructor
℘ : S −→ S (8)
X 7→ {V ⊆ X}
is the powerset functor. It also maps to every function X
g−→ Y the function ℘X ℘g−→ ℘Y , which
takes subsets to their images along g. This is the nondeterminism (or powerset) monad. For
reasons discussed in Appendix A, it satisfies
S(A,℘B)  S(B,℘A)
which makes the category S℘ of nondeterminisic functions self-dual, equipping it with the natural
bijection S℘(A, B)  S℘(B, A). The idea is that, given a nondeterministic function A −→ ℘B, i.e.
knowing all possible B-outputs for each A-input allows us to extract all possible A-inputs for each
B-output, which yilelds just another nondeterministic function B −→ ℘A. See Appendix A for
more.
Notation. Since they will play leading roles, the above categories of functions with effects will
be called:
• S⊥ = P— category of partial functions, and
• S℘ = R— category of relations.
9
Background. The observation that the type constructorsM capturing functions with effects A −→
MB carry the monad structure (M, η, #) goes back to [70]3. E.g., the powerset functor forms a
monad (℘, η, #) with the units X
η−→ ℘X mapping the elements of X to singleton sets η(x) = {x},
and lifting the functions A
f−→ ℘B to ℘A f
#
−→ ℘B where f #(V) = ∪v∈V f (v). Nowadays, monads
as tools for encapsulating computational effects, are at least as popular in programming practices
as in semantical theories. Mathematically, they are in tools for encapsulating algebraic theories
[62]. Any algebraic theory induces a monad M, where MB is the free algebra generated by B.
E.g., ℘B is the free semilattice over B, and B⊥ is the free algebra over B for the algebraic theory
with a single constant and no other operations or equations. The other way around, any monad
corresponds to an algebraic theory, albeit with infinitary operations. The tacit assumption is thus
that the side-effects of computations can always be captured by some algebraic operations.
1.3.2 Necessity and reductions
Dually, a necessity modality can be introduced by
A ⊢ A
A ⊢ B ∨ C
A ⊢ B ∨ C
S(GA, B + C)
S
(
GA,GB +GC
)# −◦εB+C (9)
This time the triple (G, ε, #) is made into a comonad by the equations:
ε#A = idGA εB+C ◦ f # = f ( f ◦ t#)# = f # ◦ t#
The third equation defines the composition in the Kleisli category
|SG | = |S|
SG(A, B) = S(GA, B)
Computational interpretations of comonads are less standard, but overviews can be found in [24,
99]. We will need a history comonad to capture the time extension of processes in Sec. 2.3.1. For
the moment, let us just mention the indexing comonads
A × (−) : S −→ S (10)
X 7→ A × X
which exist for each A ∈ S, with the counits A × X ε−→ X realized by the projections, and the lifting
A×X h−→ Y +Z defined to be A×X 〈idA,h〉−−−−→ A× (Y +Z)  (A×Y)+ (A×Z). The Kleisli category SA×
freely adjoins an indeterminate arrow 1
x−→ A to S, and plays the role of the polynomial extension
3The monad signature used there, and in most other earlier presentations, has a cochainmap µ as the third compo-
nent. The equivalent version with # seems more convenient for program derivations.
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S[x : A] [57, 79]. Like any Kleisli category, SA× provides a resolution of its comonad, in the sense
that it factors through the functors
A × (−) =
(
S
−◦ε−−→ SA× #−→ S
)
as displayed in (9). While the Kleisli resolution is initial among the resolutions of the comonad
A × (−), some of the constructions in this paper are built upon the fact that the resolution
A × (−) =
(
S
ΠA−→ S/A Dom−−−→ S
)
is final among all resolutions. Here S/A is the category of S-morphisms into A, the functor ΠA
functor maps X to the projection A × X πA−→ A, whereas the Dom functor Dom takes the S/A-
objects, which are the S-morphisms with the codomain A, to their domains Dom(X −→ A) = X.
Lemma 1.1 The domain functor Dom : S/A −→ S is final among all functors F : C −→ S which
map the terminal object 1 into A.
C
S
S/A
∃!F′
∀F
Dom
Proof. Given F with F1 = A, the unique F′ with Dom ◦ F′ = F is F′X = F(X !−→ 1). 
1.4 Labelled sequents, commutative monads, and surjections
In propositional logic, a sequent X ⊢ Y transforms proofs of X into proofs of Y . If there are several
different ways to derive one from the other, the sequent X ⊢ Y identifies them all. This leads to
a mismatch within the propositions-as-types interpretation because it implies that there is at most
one proof X ⊢ A ⊃ B, while there can be many different terms typed X t−→ (A⇒B). This mismatch
is resolved by labelling the sequents, by writing X | t−→ A ⊃ B for the former sequent. We use the
symbol |→ (and not ⊢) for labelled sequents, to be able to write X |→Y instead of X | f−→Y when the
label f is irrelevant. The categorical proof theory originates from studies of labelled sequents in
[52, 54, 55]. A non-categorical theory of labelled sequents was developed in [36].
For a modality ^, the sequents between the propositions ^A ∧ ^B and ^(A ∧ B) are derivable
both ways, and the two are considered equivalent. The proposition ^⊤ is also equivalent to the
truth ⊤. For a monad M, the maps M(A × B) → MA × MB and M1 → 1 are derivable from the
cartesian structure, and the maps MA × MB → M(A × B) and 1 → M1 are given by the monad
structure. These maps both ways generally do not make their types isomorphic. This is in the first
case justified since the side-effects of type M(A × B) are different from the side-effects when MA
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and MB separately. On the other hand, the trivial outputs of type 1 should not cause nontrivial side
effects of type M1. The type M1 should thus be trivial again, i.e. isomorphic with 1. If the monad
M is viewed as an algebraic theory, this requirement means that there should be no constants in
the algebraic signature of M. This requirement is not satisfied either by the maybe monad, or by
the nondeterminism monad, as the former gives the universe P = S⊥ of sets and partial maps, the
latter the universe R = S℘ of sets and relations. The former is the category of free algebras for
the theory with a single constant ⊥, and no other operations. The latter is the category of free join
semilattices, where the lattice unit is a constant again.
Lemma 1.1 says that making 1 into the unit type (final object) in R = S℘ leads to the slice
category tR = R/1, which boils down to
|tR| =
∐
A∈|S|
℘A
tR(S ⊆A, T⊆B) =
{
R ∈ R(A, B) | (x ∈ S ⇐⇒ ∃y ∈ T. xRy) ∧ (11)
∧ (y ∈ T ⇐⇒ ∃x ∈ S . xRy)
}
Since the ⇒-direction of each of the conjuncts in (11) implies the ⇐-direction of the other con-
junct, the requirement boils down to ∀x ∈ S∃y ∈ T. xRy and ∀y ∈ T∃x ∈ S . xRy. The category
tR is thus equivalent to the subcategory of R comprised of the relations that are total in both di-
rections. Proceeding in a similar way to make 1 into the final type in the category S⊥ = P leads to
the slice category tP = P/1, which is equivalent to the subcategory of S spanned by the surjective
functions:
|tP| =
∐
A∈|S|
℘A
tP(S ⊆A, T⊆B) =
{
f ∈ S(S , T ) | y ∈ T ⇒ ∃x ∈ S . f (x) = y
}
(12)
Remark for the category theorist. The forgetful functor tP −→ tS, where tS is the category of
sets and surjections, is an equivalence because it is surjective on the objects, and full and faithful
on the morphisms. However, for each set S ∈ S there is a proper class of sets A such that S ⊆A ∈ tP
is mapped to S ∈ tS. Constructing the adjoint equivalence tS −→ tP thus involves a choice from
these proper classes of objects.
2 Deriving process logics
2.1 Idea of process
The alignment of logics and type theory remains remarkably stable as long as the world is assumed
to be stable for long enough, i.e. if true propositions remain true, and if data types remain static.
The problems arise when processes need to be modeled, and the dynamic aspects need to be taken
into account.
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There are physical processes, chemical processes, mental processes, social processes. The
common denominator seems to be that they evolve in time. In other words, they change state:
a physical process changes the state of the matter; a mental process changes he state of mind.
Computation is also a process. Although already a local execution of a program changes the local
states of a computer, it seems that the crucial aspects of processes of computation arise from their
interleaving with the processes of communication, from the resulting computational interactions,
and only emerge into the light when the problem of concurrency is taken into account. That is why
the semantics of computational processes, formalized in process calculi, initially forked off from
the main branch of semantics of programming languages. The main part of Samson Abramsky’s
work, which I am here trying to summarize in logical terms, was concerned with bringing the two
branches together.
2.2 Process propositions and implications
2.2.1 Process sequents must be labelled
Process logics involve modeling states. There are many different ways to model states, but within
a propositions-as-types framework, state spaces occur among the data types, and both are subject
to propositional derivation rules. While we shall see in Sec. 2.4 that the two must be treated
differently even on the logical side, they both require labelled sequents. For state spaces, this is
clearly unavoidable. As mentioned in Sec. 1.4, an unlabelled sequent X ⊢ Y identifies all different
proofs that X entails Y . In particular, there is just one entailment X ⊢ X, the trivial one. But if X is
a state space, then modeling state transitions requires nontrivial sequents X | ξ−→X. The labels allow
distinguishing the nontrivial sequents, where the states change, from the trivial one, where they do
not.
2.2.2 Process implications
A process implication [A, B] asserts asserts not just that A implies B, but also that A implies [A, B].
Under the propostions-as-types interpretation, the type [A, B] thus comes with two functions
• A ∧ [A, B] |→B (υ•)
• A ∧ [A, B] |→ [A, B] (υ◦)
The proposition [A, B] thus asserts not just that B is true whenever A is, but it also asserts its own
truth under the assumption that A is true. This is a typical impredicative logical construct. We
are, of course, taught at high school that we should not use a proposition when we are proving
that proposition. But the proposition [A, B] only uses a itself guarded by A. This is the logical
principle of guarded-induction, or coinduction, which turns out to be consistent, with most logical
frameworks [32, 80], and tacitly used in classical mathematics [91, 88, 89]. The idea is that,
whenever a proposition X, together with a proposition A, entails a proposition B, and moreover
also itself, i.e. whenever X comes with the sequents
• A ∧ X |→B (~−•)
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• A ∧ X |→X (~−◦)
then X also entails the process implication [A, B]. Putting it all together, we get the introduction
rules for process implication:
υ
A ∧ [A, B] |υ−→B ∧ [A, B]
A ∧ X |ϕ−→B ∧ X
~−
X |~ϕ−−−→ [A, B]
S(A × X, B × X)
S (X, [A, B])
~−X (13)
Terminology. A function in the form ξ : A×X −→ ξB×X is often called a machine, and the set X
is construed as its state space. The induced description

ξ

: X −→ [A, B] is called anamorphism.4
Naturality. Comparing the ~−-rule with the (⊃)-rule in Sec. 1.2.3, shows the sense in which
[A, B] is a dynamic version of the implication AB. But note that the rule (⊃) is reversible, whereas
the rule ~− is not; and that the X-natural bijection in (4) on the right boils down to a X-natural
transformation on the right in (13). Moreover, since X occurs on both sides of the sequent A∧X |ϕ−→
B ∧ X, and thus in both covariant and contravariant position in S(A × X, B × X), the naturality of
~−X is not as simple as in (5), but it turns out to add more to the story. The naturality is this time
in the form
S (A × Y, B × Y) S (A × X, B × X)
S (Y, [A, B]) S (X, [A, B])
~−Y
ΘAB f
~−X
(−◦ f )
(14)
where ΘAB is the functor
ΘAB : S
o −→ R (15)
X 7→ S(A × X, B × X)
where R is the category of sets and relations, described in Appendix A. The arrow part of this
functor transforms a function f ∈ S(X, Y) into the relation ΘAB f = ( f ) ⊆ S(A × Y, B × Y) × S(A ×
X, B × X) defined by
ζ( f )ξ ⇐⇒
A × Y A × X
B × Y B × X
ζ ξ
A× f
B× f
(16)
4Anamorphisms are the coalgebra homomorphisms into final coalgebras. The name is due, I believe, to Lambert
Meertens. It seems to have caught on in functional programming without having been introduced in a publication. A
machine A × X −→ B × X can be viewed as a coalgebra X −→ (A⇒ (B × X)).
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The relation (− ◦ f ) in (14) is the arrow part of the functor
ΞAB : S
o −→ R (17)
X 7→ S(X, [A, B])
where ΞAB f = (− ◦ f ) ⊆ S(Y, [A, B]) × S(X, [A, B]) is defined
y(− ◦ f )x ⇐⇒ y ◦ f = x (18)
ΞAB is, of course, just homming into [A, B], i.e. a functor to S extended along the inclusion S ֒→ R
of functions as special relations, to allow expressing the naturality of ~− : ΘAB −→ ΞAB. Spelling
out this naturality shows that ~− must preserve the machine (i.e. coalgebra) homomorphisms
specified in (16). The concept of an AB-machine homomorphism has thus been reconstructed
logically, from the properties of the dynamic implication [A, B] in (13). Moreover, setting [A, B]
for Y in (13) we get the outer square in
S (A × [A, B] , B × [A, B]) S (A × X, B × X)
υ ϕ
id[A,B]

ϕ

S ([A, B] , [A, B]) S (X, [A, B])
~−
(~ϕ)
~−
(−◦~ϕ)
(19)
The inner square says that, if we bind together the two left-hand rules in (13) by requiring that
~υ[A,B] = id[A,B]
then the naturality requirement in (13) implies that A × [A, B] υ−→ B × [A, B] is a final AB-machine.
2.2.3 Process propositions
A static proposition B is equivalent with the static implication ⊤ ⊃ X, where ⊤ is the true propo-
sition. Propositions can thus be viewed as a special case of implications, namely the implications
from the truth. A dynamic proposition [B] can thus be defined in the form [B] = [⊤, B]. Since the
conjunctions ⊤ ∧ X are also equivalent with X, dynamic propositions can be defined by the rules
υ
[B] |υ−→B ∧ [B]
X |β−→B ∧ X
~−
X |~β−−−→ [B]
S(X, B × X)
S(X, [B])
~−
Retracing the analysis from Sec. 2.2.2 now presents a proposition [B] with a structure map [B]
υ−→
B × [B], as final among all maps in the form X −→ B × X. The structure map is thus a pair
υ = 〈υ•, υ◦〉, where υ• : [B] −→ B gives an output of the process proposition, or an action, and
υ◦ : [B] −→ [B] gives a resumption. It is thus a stream of elements in B.
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2.3 Relating process implications and static implications
The static implication is defined by the rules and the correspondence in (4). The process impli-
cation is defined by the rules and the correspondence in (4). How are they related? Under which
conditions are both sets of rules supported? Can the dynamic implication be derived from the static
one by adding some feature capturing dynamics? Can the static implication be derived from the
dynamic one by projection out that feature? — Prop. 2.3.3 answers these questions. We first define
the structures involved in the answers.
2.3.1 History types
A process of A-histories over a state space X is a pair of functions ξ = 〈ξ•, ξ◦〉 typed
A
ξ•−→ X ξ
◦
←− A × X (20)
The idea is that,
• ξ•(a) ∈ X is the initial state of a process that starts with a ∈ A;
• ξ◦(x, a) ∈ X is the next state of a process after the state x ∈ X and event or action a ∈ A.
A history an = ( a1 a2 · · · an ) thus takes the process ξ to the state
xn = ξ
◦(an, ξ
◦(an−1, . . . ξ
◦(a1, ξ
•(a0)) · · · ))
Each string of n actions, construed as an A-history is thus mapped to a unique element of X. If the
histories ( a1 · · · an ) are viewed as the elements of An, then the disjoint union (coproduct)
A+ =
∞∐
n=1
An
is the type of all A-histories. This is what we call a history type. For any process of A-histories ξ
over X there is a unique function A+
LξM−→ X, such that the following diagram commutes.
A+ A × A+
A
X A × X
LξM
@
A×LξM
(−)
ξ•
ξ◦
Hence the history type constructor, the functor
(−)+ : S −→ S (21)
A 7→ A+
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2.3.2 Retracts and idempotents
A retract of A is a type B together with a pair of maps A
q
⇄
i
B such that the following diagram
commutes
A B
A B
q
ϕ idi
q
It is easy to see that A
q
⇄
i
B is a retract if and only if ϕ = i ◦ q is idempotent, i.e.
q ◦ i = idB ⇐⇒ ϕ ◦ ϕ = ϕ
We say that a universe has retracts if for every idempotent A
ϕ−→ A there is a retract A
q
⇄
i
B such
that ϕ = i ◦ q.
2.3.3 Proposition
Let S be a cartesian category. Then
a) (A⇒B) with (4) induces [A, B] with (13) if S has history types;
b) [A, B] with (13) induces (A⇒B) with (4) if S has retracts.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Definition 2.1 A cartesian closed category with history types and retracts is called process-closed.
Dynamic function abstraction is function abstraction over history types. Prop. 2.3.3 says
that a cartesian closed category with history types has final AB-machines for all types A and B,
and that their state spaces [A, B] = (A+⇒B) support rules (13). A final AB-state machine can be
constructed as a final coalgebras for the functor
EAB : S −→ S
X 7→ (A⇒B × X)
i.e. as a limit of the tower in the form
1 (A⇒B) (A⇒ (B × (A⇒B)))
En
AB
(1) En+1
AB
(1) (A+⇒B)
! (A⇒(B×!))
En
AB
(!)
(22)
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The dynamic implications [A, B] are thus modeled together with the static implications (A⇒ B),
and both sets of rules (4) and (13) are supported. Processes can thus be modeled as machines.
This was indeed the starting idea of process semantics [66]. However, early on along this path,
it becomes clear that many different machines implement indistinguishable processes, and the
problem of process equivalence arises [67]. The input and the output types A and B of a process
are observable, but the state space X may not be. In fact, any observable behavior can be realized
over many different, unobservable state spaces.
2.4 The problem of cut in process logics
The fact that a process model may not support process composition is not just a conceptual short-
coming, but a significant obstacle to applications. Engineering tasks are usually simplified by
decomposing required processes into simpler components, and by composing the implemented
components. The process component models should thus only display what the components can
output, and not their internal structure. The models should, in a sense, not display any concrete
implementation details, but should be fully abstract [66, Sec. 4].
In logical terms, this first of all means that the state spaces of state machines must be factored
out. The reason is that the composition is logically modeled by a cut rule, something like (1).
If process sequents modeled by state machines, and presented in the form X × A | ϕ−→ X × B and
Y × B |ψ−→Y ×C, then the cut rule would be something like
X ∧ A |ϕ−→X ∧ B Y ∧ B |ψ−→Y ∧ C
Z ∧ A | (ϕ;ψ)−−−→Z ∧C
(23)
But how should we reconcile the mismatch of the state spaces X and Y? What should be the
composite state space Z? In general, if processes are presented with explicit states, how should the
states be passed from process to process?
The main conceptual difference between the data and the states is that the data are processed,
whereas the states are the carriers of the processing. The main structural difference is that data can
be copied and sent in messages, whereas states cannot be freely copied or communicated in general
(although some states may be shared within a given scope). The problem of process composition
is thus that the observable aspects of processes, that get passed in process composition from one
process to another, need to be separated from the unobservable aspects, that remain hidden from the
compositions. The same problem arises in applying processes as dynamic functions, on sources as
dynamic elements. The latter are, of course, viewed as a special case of the former. The observable
aspects are thus modeled as the data types, whereas the unobservable aspects are modeled as the
state spaces.
Dispensing with the states, the process composition can thus be defined as a sequent in the
form
[A, B] ∧ [B,C] |γ−→ [A,C] (24)
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In static logics, such sequents that establish transitivity of the implication are equivalent with the
cut rule like (1). In process logics, the sequents like (24) are the solution of the problem with the
cut rule like (23). The fact that the process implications arise as final coalgebra, as established
in Sec. 2.2.2 is thus the reason why the categories where processes are composed as morphisms
have final coalgebras as hom-sets [3, 11, 87, 51]. The composition sequent in (24) ca be derived
as follows:
υ
A ∧ [A, B] |υ−→B ∧ [A, B]
A ∧ [A, B] ∧ [B,C] |α−→B ∧ [A, B] ∧ [B,C]
υ
B ∧ [B,C] |υ−→C ∧ [B,C]
B ∧ [A, B] ∧ [B,C] |β−→C ∧ [A, B] ∧ [B,C]
A ∧ [A, B] ∧ [B,C] | (α;β)−−−→ C ∧ [A, B] ∧ [B,C]
~−
[A, B] ∧ [B,C] |γ=~α;β−−−−−−→ [A,C]
(25)
The task of composing processes, and applying them to sources, thus boils down to the task of
interpreting process implications [A, B], and process propositions [A] = [⊤, A].
3 Functions extended in time
3.1 Elements extended in time as streams
The outputs of a machine a =
(
X
〈a•,a◦〉−−−−→ A × X
)
are observable as a stream aω = ( a0 a1 · · · an · · · ).
Starting from an initial state x0 ∈ X the process
• outputs a0 = a•x0 and updates the state to x1 = a◦x0 ; then it
• outputs a1 = a•x1 and updates the state to x2 = a◦x1 ; after n steps, it
• outputs an = a•xn and updates the state to xn+1 = a◦xn ; and so on.
A dynamic5 element can thus be construed as a stream of outcomes of a repeated measurement or
count. Such data streams arise in science, and modeling them is the subject of statistical inference
[33]. If the possible outcomes boil down to yes-no statements, then such streams can be construed
as process propositions6, or with dynamic truth values. When the frequencies are counted, then
they are modeled as streams of random variables, or as stochastic processes. In information theory,
they are called sources [20, Ch. 6].
3.2 Functions extended in time as deterministic channels
A dynamic function from A to B is generated by a machine in the form f =
(
A × X 〈 f
•, f ◦〉−−−−→ B × X
)
.
Starting from an initial state x0 ∈ X the process consists of the following data maps and state
5We use the terms ”dynamic” and ”extended in time” interchangeably for the moment.
6When no confusion with dynamic logic seems likely, process propositions are also called dynamic propositions.
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updates:
a0 7→ b0 = f •x0(a0) a0 7→ x1 = f ◦x0(a0)
a0 a1 7→ b1 = f •x1(a1) a0 a1 7→ x2 = f ◦x1(a1)
· · · · · ·
a0 a1 · · · an 7→ bn = f •xn(an) a0 a1 · · · an 7→ xn+1 = f ◦xn(an)
· · · · · ·
A dynamic function can thus be viewed as a stream of functions assignments in the form
f ω =
(
f0 f1 · · · fn · · ·
)
where fn = f
•
xn
: An −→ B
In information theory, such streams of functions are called deterministic channels [20, Sec. 3.2].
Their spaces will provide the propositions-as-types interpretation of process implication.
3.3 History monad and comonad
The history construction (−)+ : S −→ S, described in Sec. 2.3.1, is easily shown to be the semi-
group monad, with the structure
A A+ A+ B+
a
(
a
)
g(b1) · g(b2) · · · g(bn)
(
a1 a2 · · · an
)
η g#
where g ∈ S(B, A+), and · is the string concatenation, the semigroup operation in A+. For our
concerns, it is, however, more interesting that the same functor also forms a comonad, with the
structure
A A+ B+
an (a1a2 · · · an)
(
f (a1) f (a1a2) · · · f (a1 · · · an)
)
ε f
#
This is the history comonad. The strings (a1a2 · · · an) can be thought of as histories. The cumulative
functions f # are then extended in time. They allow capturing dynamic implications [A, B] as types,
or as objects in a category. We first capture them as the hom-sets of a category.
3.4 Category of functions extended in time
The category of free coalgebras for the comonad (−)+ is
|S+| = |S|
S+(A, B) = S(A
+, B)
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with the composition using #
A+
f−→ B
A+
f #−→ B+ B+ g−→ C
( f ; g) =
(
A+
f #−→ B+ g−→ C
)
and the counit A+
ε−→ A playing the role of identity with respect to this composition. Note, however,
that
S+(A, B)  S(1, [A, B])
The category S+, in a sense, externalizes processes from S, and makes them composable. Let us
take a closer look at the compositions.
Since A+ is the disjoint union of
∐∞
n=1 A
n, a function f : A+ −→ B can be viewed as the stream
f ω = ( f1 f2 · · · fn · · · ) of functions fn : An −→ B, like in Sec. 3.2. The corresponding cumulative
function f # : A+ −→ B+ can then be viewed as the stream f # =
(
f 1 f 2 · · · f n · · ·
)
of functions
f n : An −→ Bn which make the following diagram commute
A A2 A3 A4 Ai
B B2 B3 B4 Bi
f 1
←−π
f 2
←−π
f 3
←−π
f 4 f i
←−π ←−π ←−π
(26)
where each←−π projects away the rightmost component, and the functions f n are:
f 1 = f1 f
i+1 =
〈
f i ◦ ←−π , fi+1
〉
4 Partial functions extended in time
4.1 Output deletions and process deadlocks
Recall from Sec. 1.3.1(7) that the partiality monad (−)⊥ : S −→ S adjoins a fresh element ⊥ to
every type. A partial function f : A ⇀ B can be viewed as the total function A −→ B⊥, which
sends to ⊥ the elements where f is undefined. There are two logically different ways to lift this to
processes:
A ∧ X |→B⊥ ∧ X
X |→ [A, B⊥]
A ∧ X |→ (B ∧ X)⊥
X |→ [A, B]⊥
(27)
On the left, the process may delete some of the outputs, but it always proceeds to the next state,
whether if has produced the output or not. On the right, the process may deadlock and fail to
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produce either the output or the next state. The meanings of the two implications [A, B⊥] and
[A, B]⊥ are captured, respectively, by the final coalgebras of the two functors
DAB⊥ : S −→ S DA⊥B : S −→ S
X 7→ (A⇒ (B⊥ × X)) X 7→ (A⇒ (B × X)⊥)
The state spaces of the final coalgebras of these two functors are then the hom-sets of the two
categories of partial functions extended in time:
|S+⊥| = |S| |S⊥+| = |S|
S+⊥(A, B) = S(A
+, B⊥) S⊥+(A, B) =
∐
S ∈.A+
S(S , B) (28)
where . A+ is the set of safety specifications in A [3, 19, 87]
. A+ = {S ⊆ A+ | ~x 4 ~y ∈ S =⇒ ~x ∈ S } (29)
and where the prefix relation ~x 4 ~y means that there is ~z such that ~x~z = ~y. An S⊥+-morphism is a
ladder like (30), but with partial functions fi as rungs. The commutativity requirement imples that
fi(~s) must be defined whenever fi+1(~sa) is defined for some a. Hence S ∈. A+ in (28).
4.2 Safety and synchronicity
Since (28) for B = 1 boils down to S⊥+(A, 1) . A+, the safety properties in . A+ can be viewed
as the objects of categories of safe dynamic functions. The morphisms may be synchronous or
asynchronous, depending on whether the outputs may be deleted or not.
4.2.1 Synchronous safe functions
The category SFun of safe dynamic functions has all safety specifications as its objects. Combining
the ladders (26) in S+ with the surjections (12) of S⊥/1 shows that the safe dynamic functions are
ladders in the form
S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S i
T1 T2 T3 T4 Ti
f 1
←−π
f 2
←−π
xw
f 3
←−π
xw
f 4
xw
f i
xw
←−π ←−π ←−π
(30)
where f i are not just surjections, in the sense that for every history ~t ∈ T there is a history ~s ∈ S
such that ~t = f #(~s), but they are surjections extended in time, in the sense that the prefixes of ~t
must have been the image of the prefixes of ~s, i.e. ←−π
(
~t
)
= f #
(←−π~s ). Categorically, this amounts to
saying that the squares in (30) are weak pullbacks. Logically, the commutativity of (30) uncovers
a general coinductive pattern:
f #(~s) = ~t ⇐⇒ ∀b ∈ B
(
~tb ∈ T =⇒ ∃a ∈ A. ~sa ∈ S ∧ f #(~sa) = ~tb
)
(31)
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Such coinductive surjections lie at the heart of process theory as components of bisimulations,
which we shall encounter in the next section. Before that, note that the dynamic surjections satis-
fying (31) must be synchronous, in the sense that they preserve the length of the histories: the time
ticks steadily up the ladder. If there are silent actions, i.e. if functions may delete their outputs,
this synchronicity may be breached.
4.2.2 Asynchronous safe functions
The functions extended in time asynchronously are obtained from S⊥+. The element ⊥ added to
the outputs plays the role of the silent, unobservable action [43, 68]. Synchronous models tacitly
assume global testing capabilities of the observer [1]. Asynchrony arises because some of the
actions of the Environment may not be observable for the System. Capturing this leads to coarser
process equivalences, where the Environment may perform several steps while the System observes
just one. Viewed as channels, the asynchronous functions extended in time become deterministic
deletion channels [69]. Combining both of the constructions (28) allows capturing both forms of
the partiality in
|S⊥+⊥| = |S|
S⊥+⊥(A, B) =
∐
S ∈.A+
S(S , B⊥) (32)
A function f ∈ S(S , B⊥) can be viewed as a stream of functions f =
(
fn : S ≤n −→ B⊥
)∞
i=1, where
S ≤n are safe histories of length up to n, including the empty history, i.e.
S ≤n = (S ∩ A≤n) +
{
()
}
(33)
where A≤n is the disjoint union (coproduct)
∐n
i=0 A
i. The cumulative form f # =
(
f ≤n : S ≤n −→ B≤n
)∞
n=1
is now defined by
f ≤1() = () f ≤n+1() = ()
f ≤1(a) =
() if f1(a) = ⊥f1(a) otherwise f ≤n+1(a~x) =
 f
≤n(~x) if fn+1(a~x) = ⊥
f ≤n(~x) :: fn+1(a~x) otherwise
and its components are now the rungs of the ladder
S ≤1 S ≤2 S ≤3 S ≤4 S ≤i
B≤1 B≤2 B≤3 B≤4 B≤i
f ≤1
←−π
f ≤2
←−π
f ≤3
←−π
f ≤4 f ≤i
←−π ←−π ←−π
(34)
where each ←−π again projects away the last component. The category ASFun = S⊥+⊥/1 of asyn-
chronous safe functions has the safety specifications as its objects again, and a morphism f ∈
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ASFun(SFA, TFB) is a tower in the form
S ≤1 S ≤2 S ≤3 S ≤4 S ≤i
T≤1 T≤2 T≤3 T≤4 T≤i
f ≤1
←−π
f ≤2
←−π
xw
f ≤3
←−π
xw
f ≤4
xw
f ≤i
xw
←−π ←−π ←−π
(35)
The difference from (34) is that the rungs of the squares are weak pullbacks, and that the rungs of
the ladder are surjections7. This tower says that the surjections exended in time asynchronously
are the functions such that
f #(~s) = ~t ⇐⇒
(
∀b ∈ B. ~tb ∈ T ⇒ ∃~a ∈ A+. ~s~a ∈ S ∧ f #(~s~a) = ~tb
)
(36)
The difference from (31) is that each step up the T -side by b ∈ B is followed on the S -side by a
string of steps ~a ∈ A+, rather than a single step a ∈ A.
5 Relations extended in time
5.1 External and internal nondeterminism
Nondeterminism is modeled using the powerset monad ℘ : S −→ S, as mentioned in Sec. 1.3.1(8).
The elements U ∈ ℘A are the subsets U ∈ A. The binary relations R ⊆ A × B can thus be viewed
as functions A
•R−→ ℘B and B R•−→ ℘A. See Appendix A for more details. Nondeterminism affects
processes in two ways again: internal nondeterminism affects the outputs, whereas the external
also the states.
A × X ξ−→ (℘B × X)⊥
X
~ξ−−→ [A,℘B]⊥
A × X ζ−→ ℘(B × X)
X
~ζ℘−−−→ [A, B]℘
(37)
External nondeterminism captures partiality as the empty set ∅ ∈ ℘(B × X). We add the par-
tiality monad (−)⊥ to the internal nondeterminism on the left explicitly, because nondeterministic
processes that never deadlock appear artificial both conceptually and in models. An internal non-
deterministic process ξ that does not deadlock at a state x ∈ X on an input a ∈ A, then it determines
a unique next state ξ◦(a, x) ∈ X, and possibly produces an output from the set ξ•(a, x) ∈ ℘B. For
an internally nondeterministic process ζ on the right, both the outputs and the state transitions are
impacted by the nondeterminism, and any pair from ζ(a, x) ∈ ℘(B×X) may be produced when the
input a is consumed at state x. The intended meanings of the two process implications
[
A,℘B
]
⊥
7In the regular case, the fact that the rungs are surjections follows from the fact that the the starting component is
a surjection, and that the squares are weak pullbacks.
24
and [A, B]℘ are captured, respectively, as the final coalgebras of the functors
PAB : S −→ S QAB : S −→ S
X 7→ (A⇒ (℘B × X))⊥ X 7→ ℘(A × B × X) (38)
where we use ℘(A × B × X)  (A ⇒ ℘(B × X)). The state spaces of the final coalgebras of these
two functors are quite different. We consider them separately, in the next two sections.
5.2 External nondeterminism
5.2.1 Synchronous safe relations
The state space of the final coalgebra of the functor PA℘B can be constructed within S as a limit of
the tower like (22)
1 (A⇒℘B)⊥
(
A⇒ (℘B × (A⇒℘B)⊥))⊥
Pn
AB
(1) Pn+1
AB
(1)
[
A,℘B
]
⊥
! (A⇒(℘B×!))
Pn
A℘B
(!)
(39)
or presented simply as
|S+℘| = |S| (40)
S+℘(A, B) =
∐
S ∈.A+
S(S ,℘B)
A morphism from A to B in S+℘ is thus a pair 〈S ,R〉, where S ⊆ A+ is a safety specification, and
R is a stream of relations, presented as functions •R =
(
S n
•Rn−−→ ℘B
)∞
n=1
, where S n = S ∩ An, or
viewed cumulatively as
•R# =
(
S n
•Rn−−→ (℘B)n )∞
n=1
The inductive definition is like at the end of Sec. 3. On any input (a1 a2 · · · an) ∈ S the n-th
component of •R# thus produces an n-tuple of subsets of B:
(a1 a2 · · · an)Rn =
〈
a1R1, (a1a2)R2, . . . , (a1 · · · an−1)Rn−1, (a1 · · · an−1an)Rn
〉
(41)
If each each function S n
•Rn−−→ (℘B)n is viewed as a relation S n Rn←→ Bn, then (41) says that they
make the following tower commute
S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S i
R1 R2 R3 R4 Ri
B B2 B3 B4 Bi
←−π ←−π ←−π
←−π ←−π ←−π
(42)
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To preclude nontrivial side-effects of processes with trivial outputs, we slice over the trivial type 1
again, and take the category of safe synchronous relations extended in time to be
SProc = S+℘/1 (43)
This is the original interaction category, introduced in [3], and further studied in [11, 87]. The
descriptions were different, but it is easy to see that the objects coincide, since the morphisms
S ∈ S+℘(A, 1) are the prefix-closed sets S ⊆ A+. Reasoning like in Sec. 4.2.1, a morphism SFA R←→
TFB in S+℘/1 is now reduced to a ladder of spans
S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S i
R1 R2 R3 R4 Ri
T1 T2 T3 T4 Ti
←−π ←−π ←−π
pw
xw
pw
xw
pw
xw
pw
xw
←−π ←−π ←−π
(44)
Like in (11), we have relations that are total in both directions, which means that the projections
R → S and R → T are surjective, in this case componentwise. Like in (30), the surjections are
extended in time, in the sense that all rhombi in (44) are weak pullbacks. Putting it all together,
this tower says that R satisfies
~s R~t ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A
(
~sa ∈ S ⇒ ∃b ∈ B. ~tb ∈ T ∧ ~sa R~tb
)
∧
∀b ∈ B
(
~tb ∈ T ⇒ ∃a ∈ A. ~sa ∈ S ∧ ~sa R~tb
)
(45)
This condition means that SFA
R←→ TFB is a strong or synchronous bisimulation relation [68, 74],
as required in the original definition of SProc in [3].
Bisimulations are intrinsic. Bisimulations were originally motivated by the intended semanti-
cal identifications of processes, and imposed as a requirement. Here, they are not imposed, but
arise as a property of morphisms in a category. The category is, however, built by applying the
nondeterminism monad ℘, the history comonad (−)+, and then it is sliced over 1. The notion of
bisimulation is thus a logical property of nondeterministic processes, provided that the processes
with trivial outputs have trivial side-effects.
5.2.2 Asynchronous safe relations
Capturing unobservable, silent actions leads to asynchronicity, and to the notion of weak or obser-
vational bisimulation [43, 68]. Proceeding like in Sec. 4.2.2, we consider the final coalgebras of
the functors
PAB⊥ : S −→ S (46)
X 7→ (A⇒ (℘(B⊥) × X))⊥
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as the hom-sets of the category
|S+℘⊥| = |S| (47)
S+℘⊥(A, B) =
∐
S ∈.A+
S(S ,℘(B⊥))
The morphism tower is like (42), but with each S n, Rn and B
n replaced replaced with S ≤n, R≤n and
B≤n, as in (33) and (34). The category of safe asynchronous relations extanded in time is now
ASProc = S+℘⊥/1
and the morphism tower is like (44), with the same modification of the subscripts and the su-
perscripts. This modified tower characterizes the following logical property of the asynchronous
relation R extended in time:
~s R~t ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A
(
~sa ∈ S ⇒ ∃b ∈ B (~tb ∈ T ∧ ~sa R~tb) ∨
∃~x ∈ A∗ (~sa~x ∈ S ∧ ~sa~x R~t )) ∧
∀b ∈ B
(
~tb ∈ T ⇒ ∃a ∈ A ( ~sa ∈ S ∧ ~sa R~tb) ∨
∃~y ∈ B∗ (~tb~y ∈ T ∧ ~s R~tb~y)) (48)
This characterizes the weak or observationsl bisimulations of [43, 68]. The category ASProc is
equivalent to the one introduced and studied under the same name in [3, 77, 87].
5.3 Internal nondeterminism
5.3.1 Synchronous dynamic relations
The state space of the final coalgebra of the functor QAB from (38) should again come with a tower
like
1 ℘(A × B) ℘(A × B × ℘(A × B)
Qn
AB
(1) Qn+1
AB
(1) [A, B]℘
! ℘(A×B×!)
Pn℘AB(!)
(49)
The trouble is that such a tower never stabilizes within a universe of sets, since there is no set X
such that X  ℘X. If we take A = B = 1, the tower boils down to
1 ℘1 ℘℘1 ℘n1 ℘n+1(1) [1, 1]P = H
∪ ∪ ∪ ∪
(50)
where the coinductive fixpoint H is the class of hypersets, or non-wellfounded sets [16]. It is dual
to von Neumann’s class of well-founded sets [105, 107], which arises as the inductive fixpoint V
along the tower
∅ ℘∅ = 1 ℘℘1 ℘n1 ℘n+11 Vǫ ǫ ǫ ǫ ǫ (51)
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Von Neumann, of course, did not draw categorical diagrams, but specified his construction in terms
of transfinite induction
V0 = ∅ Vβ =
⋃
α<β
℘(Vα) V =
⋃
α∈Ord
Vα (52)
The class Ord of ordinals is assumed to be given, so the construction actually provides an inner
model of set theory within a given universe of sets and classes [16], or equivalently within a
universe with an inaccessible cardinal, which can then play the role of the class Ord [21].8. In
any case, reach a fixpoint within a given universe, the constructor ℘ must be restricted to stay
within a smaller universe. Early on, Go¨del restricted it to the subsets definable in the language of
set theory, and constructed the universe L of constructible sets, proving the independence of the
Continuum Hypothesis, and launching the whole industry of the independence proofs [39]. Inner
models of set-theory in categories of topological spaces, or abstract spaces, have been constructed
by restricting to open subspaces [45]. Although set theorists often explicitly exclude ℵ0 from the
definition of inaccessible cardinals, the fact that the inequalities 2n < ℵ0 and ∪n < ℵ0 are satisfied
for all for all n < ℵ0 makes ℵ0 inaccessible from the universe fS of finite sets. Formally, it is the
subcategory of S spanned by U ∈ S such that #U < ℵ0, where #U denotes the cardinality of U.
Since computation is mostly concerned with finite sets, fS is often taken to be the universe of ”small
sets”, and S is interpreted as the universe of ”classes”. The powerset construction ℘ : S −→ S
where ℘X = {U ⊂ X} is then replaced with P : S −→ S where
PX = ℘<ωX = {U ⊂ X | #U < ℵ0} (53)
which restricts to P : fS −→ fS. The tower (50) for P instead of ℘ thuys lies in fS, and reaches
a fixpoint H  PH in S after countably many steps. Since P does not preserve limits, the tower
does not stabilize at its limit. It turns out to stabilize at a retract of its limit [17, 21, 53, 80]. The
projections from the fixpoint down the tower are still jointly monic, and thus still allow inductive
reasoning aboutH = [1, 1]P and [A, B]P.
Continuing with the workflow from the preceding sections, we use the dynamic implications
defined in (49) and define the universe of sets with synchronous dynamic relations:
|SP| = |S| (54)
SP(A, B) = [A, B]P
Like before, we factor out any nontrivial side-effects of processes with trivial outputs by slicing
over the trivial type 1 again and define the category dynamic synchronous relations
DProc = SP/1 (55)
But now something new happens. When nondeterminism is internalized and the coinductive
process accummulates states along the towers (49) by reapplying the powerset constructor P to
8A universe with sets and classes can be viewed as a model of the NBG set theory, whereas the one with an
inaccessible cardinal can be interpreted in terms of the ZFC axioms [65, Ch. 4].
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the previously accummulated state spaces, then that the label sets A, B ∈ S turn out to be su-
perfluous, and dispensable. They were used in all constructions so far to identify actions across
different processes. Now the actions can be identified by their histories, recorded in their struc-
ture. When nondeterminism is internalized, the coinductive process if building process becomes
self-contained.
5.3.2 Internalising the labels
All process universes presened up to so far have been built starting from a given universe S of
labels. The coinductive construction leading to DProc has a novel feature that it can be built
starting from nothing: the role of the label sets A ∈ S can be played by structures arising from the
construction itself. The role of the labels a ∈ A is to identify the same action when it occurs in
different observations, or safety specifications S or T . This is assured by modeling them as subsets
S , T ⊆ A+. The upshot is that there can be at most one label-preserving function S −→ T , namely
the inclusion S ֒→ T .
When all actions arise in a cumulative hierarchy, by iterating the constructorP, be it inductively
(51) or coinductively (50), they are always given as sets with the element relation ǫ , which records
the elements of each set, their elements, and so on. The axiom of extensionality
a = b ⇐⇒ (∀x. x ǫ a ⇐⇒ x ǫ b) (56)
says that this ǫ -structure completely determines the identity of each set: two sets with the same
elements are the same set. In the cumulative hierarchy, the elements are also sets, so the same
elements are also the sets with the same elements. If such hereditary ǫ -relations are unfolded into
trees, then the extensionality axiom means that these trees must be irredundant: they have no non-
trivial automorphisms. In other words, they cannot contain isomorphic subtrees at the same level
[75]. The ǫ -structures that arise from the cumulative processes in (51) and (50) are extensional,
thus irredundant, because the powerset constructors impose {a, a, b, c, . . .} = {a, b, c, . . .}. The other
way around, Mostowski’s Collapse Lemma [72] says that every well-founded extensional relation
corresponds to the ǫ -structure of a set somewhere in V. Aczel’s crucial observation in [16] is
that the well-foundedness assumption can be dropped: any extensional relation, including non-
wellfounded, can be reconstructed as the ǫ -relation of a hyperset, somewhere in H, or for finite
sets somewhere in H . The upshot is that any two hypersets S , T ∈ H , there is at most one ǫ -
preserving function S −→ T , or else nontrivial automorphisms arise. The role of the label sets can
now be played by the ǫ -structures.
Lemma 5.1 For every countable A ∈ S, i.e. such that #A ≤ ℵ0, there are dynamic relations A m−→ 1
and 1
e−→ A in SP which make A into a retract of 1, i.e. their composite in SP is
idA =
(
A
e
։ 1
m
֌ A
)
A proof is sketched in Appendix C. To a category theorist, Lemma 5.1 says that the subcategory
SP≤ℵ0 ֒→ SP spanned by the countable sets is the idempotent completion within SP of the endomor-
phism monoid H = SP(1, 1). For the categories
dProc = H/1 DProc≤ℵ0 = S
P
≤ℵ0/1 (57)
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we have the following corollary, proved in Appendix D.
Corollary 5.2 The inclusion
dProc ֒→ DProc≤ℵ0 (58)
is an equivalence of categories.
Remark. The equivalence in the preceding corollary means that the embedding is full and faith-
ful, and essentially surjective, i.e. that every type in DProc≤ℵ0 is isomorphic to a type in the image
of dProc. This notion of equivalence allows finidng an adjoint functor in the opposite direction
provided that the axiom of choice is given, in this case for classes. The equivalence is thus far from
effective globally. Locally, however, any structure present in DProc can be found in dProc, as long
as we do not need uncountable sets of labels. In the rest of this paper, we elide the labels.
5.3.3 Synchronous dynamic relations as hypersets
The objects of the category dProc boil down the elements of the universe of finiteH , that arises as
the coinductive fixpoint of the tower like (50), but with ℘ restricted to P = ℘≤ℵ0 . SinceH  PH ,
an element ofH can also be viewed as its finite subset, which unfolds it into a tower
S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S n S
P1 P21 P31 P41 Pn1 H
ǫ ǫ ǫ
ǫ ǫ ǫ
(59)
where all S n and Pn1 are in fS. This seems like the most convenient presentation of the objects of
dProc. A tower corresponding to a morphism R ∈ dProc(S , T ) looks just like (44) in Sec. 5.2.1,
except that the projections ←−π are replaced by the set-theoretic operation ∪. The bisimulation
condition (45) now becomes
s R t ⇐⇒ ∀s′ ǫ s ∃t′ ǫ t. s′ R t′ ∧ ∀t′ ǫ t ∃s′ ǫ s. s′ R t′ (60)
5.3.4 Asynchronous dynamic relations
So far, asynchrony has been modeled by adding a silent action label ⊥, which allowed waiting.
When the actions are modeled using the element relation ǫ , i.e. by choosing an element from a
set, then waiting can be enabled by making therelation ǫ reflexive, i.e. by assuming x ǫ x for all x.
The objects of the category aProc of asynchronous dynamic relations are now the reflexive finite
hypersets, conveniently viewed as the towers of finite subsets
S ≤1 S ≤2 S ≤3 S ≤n S
P≤11 P≤21 P≤31 P≤n1 H	
ǫ ǫ
ǫ ǫ
(61)
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where P≤nX = ∐ni=0PiX, and H	 is the universe of reflexive finite hypersets. A morphism R ∈
aProc(S , T ) is now a reflexive hyperset relation, satisfying the following property
s R t ⇐⇒ ∀s′ ǫ s (∃t′ ǫ t. s′ R t′ ∨ ∃s′′ ǫ s′. s′′R t) ∧
∀t′ ǫ t (∃s′ ǫ s. s′ R t′ ∨ ∃t′′ ǫ t′. s R t′′) (62)
While this simulation strategy arises from the mathematical structure of final coalgebras again, its
computational meaning was studied in [101, 102].
6 Integers, interactions, and real numbers
Counting generates ordinals [105], but the integers arise from the duality of counting up and down.
Geometric and algebraic transformations generate monoids, but capturing the symmetries requires
groups. The interactions between the system and the environment generate the process universes
in the preceding sections, but the dual interactions between the environment and the system were
not captured. The duality inherent in process interactions was noted, albeit in passing, very early
on in process theory:
”The whole meaning of any computing agent [would be that it is] a transducer, whose
input sequence consists of enquiries by, or responses from, its environment, and whose
output sequence consists of enquiries of, or responses to, its environment” [66, p. 160].
A similar vision of dual interactions between the system and the environment as an ongoing
question-answer protocol re-emerged in linear logic [37]. It was formalized categorically in [13],
and retraced in [4]. The mathematical underpinning turned out to be the Int-construction, the free
construction of compact structure from traced monoidal structure [46]. The name Int does not refer
to the interaction interpretation, but to the integers. Applied to the additive monoid N of natural
numbers, viz. a discrete monoidal category, the construction gives rise to the additive group Z of
integers, viewed as a discrete compact category.9 In particular, the set of integers is defined as the
quotient
Z = IntN = N− × N+/ ∼
where the equivalence relation ∼ is:
〈m−,m+〉 ∼ 〈n−, n+〉 ⇐⇒ m− + n+ = n− + m+
The two components of the product are annotated for convenience, e.g. as N− = {′′−′′} × N
and N+ = {′′+′′} × N. The general form of this Int-construction, applicable to suitable monoidal
categories, is outlined in Appendix E. The crucial feature of the monoid N which allows reducing
the equivalence classes in IntN to the representatives in the form 〈n, 0〉 or 〈0, n〉 is that
m + k = n + k =⇒ m = n
9The fact that interactions and integers are captured by the same structure is a nice example of the workings of
category theory.
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The crucial feature needed for lifting the Int-construction to monoidal categories is the trace op-
eration. We now describe how the trace operation arises in categories of relations, including the
relations extended in time, thus allowing the applications of the Int-construction to the interaction
categories.
As the categories of relations, as described in Appendix A, are self-dual, the coproducts +
generating the universe of sets S giver rise to biproducts ⊕, not only in the category R of static
relations, but also in the dynamic cases SProc, ASProc, dProc and aProc. The biproducts are by
definition both products and coproducts. The unit of the monoidal structure that they form is the
coproduct unit 0. For every type X, the biproduct structure consists of
• a monoid 0 !−−→ X [id,id]←−−− X ⊕ X, and
• a comonoid 0 !←−− X 〈id,id〉−−−→ X ⊕ X,
which are natural for all morphisms into and out of X. The projections X
π←− X ⊕ Y π
′
−→ Y and the
injections X
ι−→ X ⊕ Y ι
′
←− Y are derived from the comonoid counits and from the monoid units
respectively. A propositions-as-types interpretation of biproducts is tenuous but a process category
with the biproducts and the hom-sets [A, B] supporting a coinductive rule
A ⊕ X ξ−→ B ⊕ X
X
~ξ−−→ [A, B]
comes with the trace structure Tr derived by
A
ι−→ A ⊕ Y A ⊕ Y ⊕ [A ⊕ Y , B ⊕ Y] υ−→ B ⊕ Y ⊕ [A ⊕ Y , B ⊕ Y] B ⊕ Y π−→ B
A ⊕ [A ⊕ Y , B ⊕ Y] ι;υ;π−−→ B ⊕ [A ⊕ Y , B ⊕ Y]
[A ⊕ Y , B ⊕ Y] Tr=~ι;υ;π−−−−−−→ [A, B]
Each of the categories of relations, R, SProc, dProc, etc., is easily seen to give rise to the trace
structure in this way. See Appendix E for more.
6.1 Games as labelled polarized relations extended in time
The biproducts in ASProc are in the form
(S ⊕ T )≤1 (S ⊕ T )≤2 (S ⊕ T )≤3 (S ⊕ T )≤i
(A + B)≤1 (A + B)≤2 (A + B)≤3 (A + B)≤iπ π
(63)
where (S ⊕ T )FA+B are all shuffles of SFA and TFB.
(S ⊕ T )≤i =
{
~x ∈ (A + B)≤i | ~x ↾A∈ S ∧ ~x ↾B∈ T
}
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The trace structure of categories of relations with respect to the biproducts as the monoidal struc-
ture was analyzed already in the final section of [46], and explained in more detail for the interac-
tion categories in [4]. The analysis presented in that paper suggests that the AJM-games [12, 15, 14]
should be construed in terms of the Int-construction. The AJM-games are, of course, one of the
crowning achievements of the quest for fully abstract models of PCF, and a tool of many other
semantical results. They appeared in many different semantical contexts [5, 14, 100], with many
refinements and different presentation details. A crude common denominator can be obtained by
applying the Int-construction from Appendix E to the category ASProc, leading to
|Gam| = |ASProc|− × |ASProc|+
Gam(S , T ) = ASProc(S − ⊕ T+, T− ⊕ S +)
Some of the crucial features of game semantics, such as the copycat strategy, and the various
switching and starting conditions, arise in such reconstructions as abstract mathematical properties,
like the notions of bisimulations arose before.
6.2 Polarized dynamics
Since P(A + B)  PA × PB, applying the powerset constructor on polarized sets X− + X+ leads to
the functor
Q : S −→ S
X 7→ P−X × P+X
where the subscripts are still just annotations, and we can take, e.g., P−X = {′′−′′} × PX and
P+X = {′′+′′} × PX.
6.2.1 Synchronous case
The universe of signed finite hypersets can be constructed just like the universe of hypersets in
Sec. 5.3, just bifurcating at each step:
1 P−1 × P+1 P− (P−1 × P+1) × P+ (P−1 × P+1)
Qn1 P− (Qn1) × P+ (Qn1) H±
! Q!
Qn!
(64)
The final coalgebra structure still maps each hyperset to its elements, but this time they can be
positive or negative
H± 〈
ǫ
−,
ǫ
+
〉
∪
P−H± × P+H± (65)
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Notation. Given s ∈ H±, we write s− = ǫ−(s) for the negative part and s+ = ǫ+(s) for the
positive part. We often tacitly identifyH± with P−H± × P+H±, in which case s ∈ H± becomes a
pair s = 〈s−|s+〉, where s− = ǫ−(s) and s+ = ǫ+(s). We follow [31] and denote a generic element of
s− by s−, and a generic element of s+ by s+, and abbreviate s− ∈ ǫ−(s) and s+ ∈ ǫ+(s) to s−, s+ ǫ s.
Writing s = {s− | s+} instead of s = 〈s−, s+〉 is yet another well-established notational abuse, used
to great effect used by John Conway in [31]. E.g., instead of ∪s = 〈∪s−,∪s+〉, the unions in (65)
can be written in the form
∪s = {s−−, s−+ | s+−, s++}
and other coinductive definitions become even simpler,
⊖ s = {⊖s+ | ⊖ s−} s ⊕ t = {s− ⊕ t, s ⊕ t− | s+ ⊕ t, s ⊕ t+} (66)
Synchronous hypergames. The objects of the category gam are the signed finite hypersets from
the universe H±. The final coalgebra structure (65) separates their elements into a negative and
a positive part. In game semantics, this is interpreted as separating a game s ∈ H± into a pair
s = 〈s−, s+〉, where s− = {s− ǫ s} ∈ P−(H±) are the moves available to the player −, whereas
s+ = {s+ ǫ s} ∈ P+(H±) are the moves available to the player +. The projections H±
qi−→ Qn1
down the tower (64) represent each game s ∈ H± as a stream [s1, s2, s3, . . . , sn+1, . . .], where sn+1 =
qn+1(s) ∈ Qn+11 = P−(Qn1) × P+(Qn1), and thus sn+1 = 〈sn+1− , sn+1+ 〉, where sn+1− , sn+1+ ⊆ Qn1.
A morphism R ∈ gam(s, t) should be a synchronous hyperstrategy. It is a hyperstrategy
because the players − and + play two games s and t, or more if at least one these are already
a composite game, or less if one of them is empty. The dual goals of the two players makes a
hyperstrategy into a polarized version of synchronous bisimulations (60). But the polarization
separates the two simulation tasks, and each player is tasked with one:
s R t ⇐⇒ ∀s− ǫ s ∃t− ǫ t. s− R t− ∧ ∀t+ ǫ t ∃s+ ǫ s. s+ R t+ (67)
The player − is tasked with simulating every s-step by a t-step, whereas the player + is tasked with
simulating every t-step by an s-step.
6.2.2 Asynchronous case
Using the functor Q : S −→ S where QX = X + QX, the tower in (64) becomes
1 Q≤1(1) Q≤2(1) Q≤n(1) Q≤n+1(1) R! Q! Q
n
!
(68)
where Q≤n(1) =∐ni=0 Qi(1). The final coalgebra structure is thus
R
ǫ

∪
R + P−R × P+R (69)
The coalgebra structure ǫmaps s = 〈s−, s+〉 to s = ǫ(s) if s− ∈ s− and s+ ∈ s+. Otherwise it
unfolds its elements into s− = ǫpp(s) and s+ =
ǫ
+(s) like before. A straightforward induction
along the tower gives the following.
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Lemma 6.1 Every s ∈ R is ǫ -transitive, in the sense that for all s−, s+ ∈ s holds
s−− ⊆ s− ⊆ s−+ s++ ⊆ s+ ⊆ s+− (70)
The elements of the universe R of transitive finite signed hypersets can be thought of as asyn-
chronous hypergames. They are the objects of the category R. An asynchronous hyperstrategy
R ∈ R(s, t) resembles a branching bisimulation from (62), except that the two simulation tasks are
again separated, like in (67), and assigned to the two players:
s R t ⇐⇒ ∀s− ǫ s (∃t− ǫ t. s− R t− ∨ ∃s−+ ǫ s−. s−+R t) ∧
∀t+ ǫ t (∃s+ ǫ s. s+ R t+ ∨ ∃t+− ǫ t+. s R t+−) (71)
Lemma 6.1 makes the relations induced by the coalgebra structure on R into hyperstrategies. Re-
member that s− ǫ s abbreviates s− ∈ ǫ(s) ∈ P−R, whereas s+ ǫ s abbreviates s+ ∈ ǫ(s) ∈ P+R.
Lemma 6.2 For any s ∈ R and all s−, s+ ǫ s, the relations s− ǫ s and s ǫs+ satisfy (71).
Proof. s−− ⊆ s− implies that for every s−− there is s′− with s−− ǫ s′−. s+ ⊆ s+− implies that for every
s+ there is some s−+ with s−+ ǫ s+. Hence (71) for s− ǫ s. s− ⊆ s−+ implies that for every s− there is
s+− with s − ǫs+−. s++ ⊆ s+ implies that for every s++ there is some s′+ with s′+ ǫs++. Hence (71) for
s
ǫ
s+. 
Remark. The property in (71) is not self-dual under the relational converse, but under the polarity
change in (66). In game semantics, this duality corresponds to switching the roles of the player and
the opponent. A winning strategy of the player becomes winning for the opponent, and vice versa.
The game-theoretic equilibrium strategies, where both players play their best responses, seems
to correspond to reimposing the bisimulation requirement: that the same relation is a simulation
both ways. The equilibrium strategies would support two dualities: not just the polarity change
(i.e. switching the players), but also the relational converse (i.e. playing in the opposite direction).
While the two dualities are in general not independent, in the situations when they commute, they
would induce the dagger-compact structure, akin to the adjunction vs. transposition over complex
vector spaces, in theory of modules, and in many other areas of geometry. This structure was not
used in game semantics, but it emerged in the Abramsky-Coecke models of quantum protocols,
and has been explored in other areas of semantics of computation [10, 29, 81].
6.3 A category of real numbers
In closing this section, we encounter a remarkable fact: that the posetal collapse of the category R
boils down to the ordered field R of the real numbers. On one hand, this may not be surprising,
since John Conway reconstructed numbers from games a long time ago [31], and game semantics
was informed by his constructions since early on [12]. On the other hand, game semantics has
been developed as semantics of computational processes.
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6.3.1 Coalgebra of reals
We adapt the alternatic dyadics from [88, Sec. 3.2]10 to present the real numbers. Consider the
alphabet Σ = {−,+}, and denote by Σ⊛ the set of finite and infinite strings over it. It comes with the
coalgebra structure
Σ⊛
χ

(::)
1 + Σ × Σ⊛ (72)
where χ maps the empty string () into 1 and each nonempty strings into its head symbol and the
tail string. Equivalently, this coalgebra can be written in the form
Σ⊛
κ

[o,h−,h+]
1 + Σ⊛− + Σ
⊛
+ (73)
Where the product Σ×Σ⊛, which is {−,+}×Σ⊛ is expanded into {−}×Σ⊛ + {+}×Σ⊛, and the products
with the singletons are abbreviated as subscripts. The structure map κ now maps the empty string
into 1, and the strings in the form ± :: ~x as ~x into Σ⊛±, whereas the components h− and h+ add − and
+ as the head, while o maps the singleton from 1 into the empty string.
Each Σ-string encodes a unique real number. The idea is that we count the first string of −s or
+s in the unary, and after that proceed in the algernating dyadics, e.g.
+ + − − − + −− 7→ +1 + 1 − 1
2
− 1
4
− 1
8
+ 1
16
− 1
32
− 1
64
− − − − + − + · · · 7→ −1 − 1 − 1 − 1 + 1
2
− 1
4
+ 1
8
· · ·
Since the infinite strings of −s and of +s encode the two infinities, we will have a map into the
extended reals R = R∪ {∞,−∞}. The bijection Σ⊛  R is described in Appendix F. We henceforth
identify the two, and use both names interchangeably, since Σ⊛ refers to the encoding, and R says
what is encoded.
Ordering. The usual ordering of the reals in R corresponds to the lexicographic ordering of Σ⊛.
When the finite strings are padded by 0s, the symbol ordering is − < 0 < +.
6.3.2 Numbers extended in time: Conway’s version of Dedekind cuts
Theorem 6.3 There are functors
R
Γ
Υ
R (74)
which make the extended continuum R into the posetal collapse of the category R of asynchronous
hypergames. In particular,
10See also [89] [91] for a broader context.
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• for every real number ς ∈ R holds ΥΓ(ς) = ς;
• for every asynchronous hypergame s ∈ R there are natural hyperstrategies
s
η−→ ΓΥ(s) and ΓΥ(s) ε−→ s
Proof (sketch) . The functor Γ can be obtained from the anamorphism ~κ
R R + P−R × P+R
R R + P−R × P+R
κ
~κ ~κ+P−~κ+P+~κ
ǫ
where κ is derived from (73), by mapping the empty string to the empty string, the Σ-strings in the
form (− :: ς) to the pair 〈{ς}, ∅〉, and the strings in the form (+ :: ς) to 〈∅, {ς}〉. Setting Γς = ~κ ς,
the functoriality of Γ boils down to the observation that the lexicographic order ς ≤ ϑ on Σ⊛ lifts
to a relation s ≤ t on s = Γς and t = Γϑ which satisfies (71), i.e.
s ≤ t ⇐⇒ ∀s− ǫ s (∃t− ǫ t. s− ≤ t− ∨ ∃s−+ ǫ s−. s−+ ≤ t) ∧
∀t+ ǫ t (∃s+ ǫ s. s+ ≤ t+ ∨ ∃t+− ǫ t+. s ≤ t+−) (75)
As long as ς and ϑ are unpadded by 0s, their lexicographic ordering leads to s = Γς and t = Γϑ
satisfying the synchronous comparison clauses s− ≤ t− and s+ ≤ t+ of (75). If ϑ is padded by 0s,
then (75) is satisfied because the lexicographic ordering induces s−+ ≤ t. If ς is padded by 0s, then
it induces s ≤ t+−. This completes the definition of Γ.
The functor Υ arises from Conway’s simplicity theorem [31, Thm. 11]. It picks the simplest
representatives of the equivalence classes of the posetal collapse of R, where the simplicity is
measured in [31] by the ”birthday ordinal”, which for our finite hypersets, signed or not, boils
down each element’s position on its coinduction tower. The simplicity theorem plays a central role
in all presentations of surreal numbers, and suitable versions have been proved in detail in [18, 40].
The arrow part ofΥ collapses theR-morphisms to the lexicographic order on Σ⊛. Conway shortcuts
his proof of the simplicity theorem by imposing the posetal collapse directly signed hypersets by
s ≤ t ⇐⇒ ∀s− ∈ s ∀t+ ∈ t. t  s− ∧ t+  s (76)
Instantiating this definition to t ≤ s− and to t+ ≤ s (76) gives
t  s− ⇐⇒ ∃t− ǫ t. s− ≤ t− ∨ ∃s−+ ǫ s−. s−+ ≤ t
t+  s ⇐⇒ ∃t+− ǫ t+. s ≤ t+− ∨ ∃s+ ǫ s. s+ ≤ t+
and shows that (76) implies (75). The converse, just like the proofs of the simplicity theorem in
[18, 40], involve routinely but extensive case reasoning. The equivalence classes of the posetal
quotient of R are thus ordered by (76), which on Σ⊛ boils down to the lexicographic order. 
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Remarks. Conway’s proof of the simplicity theorem demonstrates coinduction in action, not
only at the formal level in (76), but also at the meta-level. In order to define the R-ordering of the
minimal representatives of the equivalence classes of his games, reduced to numbers, he imposes
the sought ordering as a preorder on the arbitrary representatives, and then uses that preorder as
a shortcut to prove the existence of the minimal representatives. Lemma 6.2 also shows how the
simplicity follows from the coinductive construction, as it implies Υ(s−) ≤ Υ(s) ≤ Υ(s+), and
steers the coinductive descent towards the simplest representative.
6.3.3 Real numbers as processes
Thm. 6.3 says that real numbers can be viewed as processes, and the other way around, that asyn-
chronous, polarized, reflexive processes boil down to real numbers, and that the simulations be-
tween them are consistent with the real number ordering. If these processes are thought of as
observations, then the reals are the outcomes of the measurements. On the other hand, compu-
tations with the reals always involve some embedding into a universe where multiple processes
correspond to each number. For irredundant representations, where each real number corresponds
to a unique stream of digits, there are always basic arithmetical operations where no finite prefix
of an input suffices to determine a finite prefix of the output [25]. Such operations clearly cannot
be computable.
Dropping the infinite strings −∞ = (− − − · · · ) and ∞ = (+ + + · · · ) on the left-hand side of
the retraction R R in (74), and the signed hypersets bisimilar to −∞ = {−∞|} and∞ = {|∞}
on the right-hand side, we get the retraction R R. It lifts to Rn Rn, and makes real
vector spaces into retracts of discrete functor categories. A real matrix L ∈ Rp×q becomes an
R-profunctor Λ =
(
p
ΓL←→ q
)
, and the linear operators Rp
L−→ Rq and Rq L
‡
−→ Rp become the R-
extensions of Λ = ΓL along the Yoneda embeddings, in the enriched-category sense.11
p Rp
q Rq
Λ
∇
Λ∗ ⊣
∆
Λ∗
The left Kan extension Λ∗ maps the functor α ∈ Rp into the coend, which is the colimit along α
of its tensors with the left transpose of Λ. The right Kan extension Λ∗ maps the functor β ∈ Rq
into the end, which is the limit along β of its cotensors with the right transpose of Λ. But since α
and β are discrete, the colimits boil down to coproducts, and the limits boil down to products. And
since R is self-dual, the products and the coproducts coincide as biproducts, and the tensors and
the cotensors also coincide, and the extensions become
Λ∗(α) =
 p⊕
i=1
αi ⊗ Λi j

q
j=1
Λ∗(β) =

q⊕
j=1
Λi j ⊗ β j

p
i=1
11The reader unfamiliar with what any of this means is welcome to skip the next paragraph paragraph.
38
where ⊕ are the biproducts in R, and ⊗ is a tensor, defined in [31] as the addition and the mul-
tiplication on the equivalence classes of Conway’s numbers, which in our framework amounts
to Υ(s ⊕ t) = Υs + Υt and Υ(s ⊗ t) = Υs · Υt. The linear action of R-matrices on R-vectors
are thus ”rediscovered” as the Kan extensions of R-profunctors along the Yoneda embeddings as
R-completions.
6.4 Where is computation?
As exciting they are, the real numbers here suggest that we seem to have lost computation some-
where along the way, while retracing the path of categorical semantics of computation. The process
universe R allows us to compute with the reals R. Each real number ς ∈ R is included as a process
Γς ∈ R. We can compute with the reals as in R, and any outcome s ∈ R can be reduced to its irre-
dundant representative Υs ∈ R. The problem is that any real number can be obtained as an output
of such computations. But most real numbers are not computable. An uncomputable real number
can be constructed by a diagonal argument. If all computations can be encoded by programs, and
programs are expressions in a countable language, then the computable reals can be enumerated.
An uncomputable real number can be constructed by choosing its n-th digit to be different from
the n-th digit in the n-th computable real number. Proceeding with quantifying how many such
numbers there are shows that most real numbers are uncomputable, whichever way we quantify
them. And we have all of them in R. Everything any oracle can tell any computer is already there.
On the path from propositions-as-types, through process propositions as types extended in time, to
dynamic interactions, the idea of computability as programmability got overshadowed the process
of computation.
In the final section, we retrace the path back to one of the original questions of categorical
semanics: How can intensional computation be characterized semantically?
7 Categorical semantics as a programming language
A process is computable if it is programmable.12 In a universe of processes, types are used to
specify requirements and to impose constraints. In a universe of computable processes, there is
also a type P of programs. Since any Turing-complete language can encode its own interpreter,
any model of a Turing-complete language must contain13 the type P of programs in that language.
A model of computable processes is extensional if it only describes the extensions of computa-
tions, i.e. their input-output functions, and does not say anything about the process of computation.
Each computable function is thus assigned a unique ”program”. Type-theoretically, this unique
”program” is captured by the abstraction operation, which maps an X-indexed family of functions
fx(a) : A×X −→ B to the corresponding X-indexed family of abstractions λa. fx(a) : X −→ (A⇒B).
12Network processes are sometimes also called computations, although they are not globally controllable, and thus
not programmable. They can be steered by interacting programs and protocols, but that is a different story. The notion
of computability was originally defined as computability by computers, and the term is still used in that sense.
13The tacit assumption is that a model of a programming language contains all types recognizable in that language.
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The application operation applies an abstraction to its inputs and recovers the corresponding func-
tion. The bijection between the abstractions and their applications was displayed in (4). If a
”program” tells not just which inputs go to which outputs, but also how some states change in
computation, then it describes not just a computable function, but a computing machine, and the
bijection between functions and their abstractions (4) becomes a mapping of machines to their
anamorphisms in (13). Each machine ξ : A × X −→ B × X is described by the induced anamor-
phism

ξ

: X −→ [A, B] in the sense that it assigns computational behaviors as meanings to the
states in X. It is just a one-way map now because there are in general some state assignments
that do not describe any actual machines, and there are different machines that are assigned the
same behaviors. The distinction between the static view (4), and the dynamic view (13) echoes the
difference between the denotational and the operational approach to semantics [5, 9, 26]. In terms
of the logical distinction between the extensional and the intensional models of meaning, going
back to Frege, Carnap, Church and Martin-Lo¨f [34], all models of computation with an operation
that maps computations into programs fall squarely on the extensional side. Genuinely intensional
models comprise operations to map programs to computations, but not the other way around.
7.1 Categorical semantics of computability
The logical schema of intensional computation therefore looks dual to (13), at least at the first
sight:
X | p−→P
{|−|}^
A ∧ X | {|p|}−−→^(B ∧ X)
S (X, P)
SM(A × X, B × X)
{|−|} (77)
The duality of (77) and (13) is disturbed by a couple of details and a deep conceptual difference.
First of all, the first clause of (13) is derivable in (77) as υ = {|idP|}, so that is not the issue. Adding
^ and M to (13) would not change the subsequent analysis, so that is not the issue either. The
feature that breaks the symmetry and points to the difference is the requirement that {|−|} in (77)
must be a surjection. If there is a way to split this surjection, by an operation
√
that would choose
for every computation c a program
√
c such that
{|√c|} = c, then there is also a way to retract
{|−|} into a bijection, and thus reduce (77) to (4), making the model extensional [42]. If no such
operations can be constructed in the model, then it can be shown that there must be infinitely many
programs p for each computation c such that c = {|p|}. In fact, such models always contain models
of Turing machines [90]. In a slightly different presentation (with effect monads reduced to the
monoidal structure that they induce), such models were introduced in [84] as monoidal computers.
For a fixed universe S and a fixed effect monad M on it, the structure of a monoidal computer is
essentially unique, in the sense that any two program types P with the structure from (77) must
be isomorphic [85]. This means that this structure captures a property, like e.g. the structure of
a lattice captures a property of the underlying poset: namely, the property that it contains the last
upper bound and the greatest lower bound for every finite subset. If the structure of monoidal
computer S thus presents a property, namely that all of its morphisms are programmable, then
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this structure captures computability-as-programmability as an intrinsic property, in the sense of
[9]. Computability of the functions in a monoidal computer can be tested and studied without
any references to external structures, since the structure of a monoidal computer can be tested and
studied without any such references, just like the structure of a group, or a topological space.
On the other hand, it was explained in [9, Sec. 1.2.3] that the notion of computability, as de-
fined in the standard Church-Turing approach, is extrinsic, in the sense that a particular computable
function is recognized as such only by referring to a particular external model, say a Turing ma-
chine or a definitional schema. This model describes a particular computation of the function, but
it is not recorded or recognizable on the function itself. The model is external to the function in
that precise sense. The fact that all such external models have been proved equivalent does not
make them internal to the function. Moreover, no canonical choice of one model over another one
can be given for a particular function. It is thus argued in [9] that the standard definitions do not
specify computability as an intrinsic structure, even less as a property of a function.
In contrast, (77) expresses the idea of computability-as-programmability as a logical struc-
ture; and by the virtue of uniqueness of that structure, as a logical property. Whatever pro-
gramming language P might be used to encode programs, its interpretation is always a mapping
S(X, P) ։ SM(A × X, B × X) of programs into computational processes. (The relation between
the X-indexing of the programs and the X-state updates of the executions will be clarified shortly.)
Whichever Church-Turing model of computation might be used to define computability, its un-
derlying execution model will map the process descriptions into the described processes, and this
mapping will engender structure of a monoidal computer again. This structure thus provides a
”canonical form witnessing computability”, sought in [9, Sec. 1.2.3]. Some of the goals stated at
the end of that paper are also pursued in [85].
The naturality requirement implicit in (77) is dual, mutatis mutandis, to the one we spelled out
for (13). More precisely, an X-indexed family {|−|}ABX : S(X, P) −→ SM(A × X, B × X) is a natural
transformation {|−|}AB : P̂ −→ ΘAB between the functors
P̂ : So −→ R ΘAB : So −→ R (78)
X 7→ S(X, P) X 7→ SM(A × X, B × X)
with the arrow parts like (16) and (18) in Sec. 2.2.2. The naturality requirement is dual to (14), so
it implies that the diagram on the left commutes for every p ∈ S(X, P).
S (P, P) S (X, P)
SM (A × P, B × P) SM (A × X, B × X)
{|−|}AB
P
(−◦p)
{|−|}ABX
(p)
A × X M(B × X)
A × P M(B × P)
{|p|}
A×p M(B×p)
{|id|}
(79)
The diagram on the right arises by chasing id ∈ S(P, P) through the diagram on the left. The left-
hand diagram says that {|id|}ABP and {|p|}ABX are related under ΘABp, which by the definition in (16)
means that the right-hand square commutes. Since the naturality implies that for all f ∈ S(Y, X)
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and p ∈ S(X, P) holds
{|p ◦ f |}Y = {|p|}X ◦ (A × f ) = {|id|}P ◦ (A × p f )
droping the subcripts from {|−|}X seldom causes confusion. The surjectivity of {|−|} moreover says
that for every computation c ∈ SM(A × X, B × X) there is an X-indexed program pc ∈ S(X, P) that
makes right-hand square in (79) commute. Since this is true for all types A and B, the claim is thus
that P is the state space of a weakly final AB-machine {|id|}ABP ∈ SM(A × P, B × P) — for all types A
and B in S.
Proposition 7.1 Let S be a process-closed category (see Def. 2.1). Let M : S −→ S be a commu-
tative monad and P a fixed type. The following structures are equivalent:
a) for any A, B ∈ S, a family of surjections {|−|} : S(X, P) ։ SM(A × X, B × X), called program
executions, natural in X with respect to the functors in (78);
b) for any A, B,C ∈ S
• a universal program evaluator ϕAC ∈ SM(A × P,C) and
• a partial program evaluator σAB ∈ S(A × P, P)
such that for any f ∈ SM(A,C) there is p ∈ S(1, P) such that
f = ϕAC ◦
(
A × p
)
ϕ(A×B)C = ϕAC ◦
(
A × σAB
)
A C
A × P A × B × P
f
A×p ϕAC ϕ(AB)C
A×σAB
(80)
Proof can be found in [85, 90].
Upshot. The proposition says that the structure of monoidal computer, displayed in (77) and
formalized in condition (a), is a categorical version of the concept of acceptable enumeration,
normally used in computability textbooks, e.g. [94]. The type P of programs is used as the set
of program indices for the enumeration. In the standard notation, the enumeration would thus be
a sequence
(
ϕnx
)n∈N
x∈P , where x is the program index, and n is the arity of the computable function
ϕx. While the computable functions are usually modeled over natural numbers, and the arity n
means that the function takes the inputs of type Nn, and always produces the outputs of type N,
the categorical treatment is over abstract types, so we write ϕAB to specify the input type A and
the output type B. The basic constructions can be simply copied from textbooks. E.g., the fixpoint
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construction behind the Recursion Theorem [94, Ch. 11] maps to the following diagram.
A × P B A × P
A × P × P
A × P A × P × P
A
g ϕ
A×σ
A×∆
A×P×p
ϕ A×σ
A×p A×〈p,p〉
(81)
The claim is that for every computable function g ∈ SM(A×P, B) there is a program Γ ∈ Pwhich de-
scribes the same function like g instantiated on it, i.e. g(a, Γ) = ϕAB
Γ
(a), for all a ∈ A. To construct
Γ, we precompose g with the partial evaluator σ, set to evaluate programs on themselves, like in
(81) on the left. The resulting computation is thus g
(
a, σ(x, x)
)
. The first clause of (80) then gives
a program p for this computation, which makes the square in (81) commute. Now we substitute p
into ς(x, x) along the left-hand arrow in the bottom triangle of (81), and call the result Γ = σ(p, p).
The bottom triangle commutes by the definition of the pairing. The right-hand triangle commutes
by the second clause of (80). All of (81) is thus commutative, and the claim is proved. A more
popular version of the Recursion Theorem says that for every effect-free τ ∈ S(P, P), thought of
as a program transformer, there is a program T which computes the same as its transform, i.e.
{T } = {τT }. Diagram (81) is easily modified to capture this claim. The two versions are, in a
suitable sense, geometrically equivalent. The claim is called ”Kleene’s amazing theorem” and its
many repercussions are discussed in [71]. Their intrinsic geometry surfaces in categorical seman-
tics, be it in the form of commutative diagrams like (81), or in string diagrams [85, 84, 104]. They
support a diagrammatic programming language that can be used to implement computable logic
and arithmetic, program schemas, abstract metaprogramming concepts like compilation, super-
compilation, synthesis, and to derive static, dynamic, and algorithmic complexity measures. The
reconstruction is comparable with the us of the λ-calculus as a theoretical programming language,
and as the foundation of the functional programming languages. The fundamental difference is
that, as mentioned above, the mere presence of the operation of λ-abstraction implies that the un-
derlying type system is essentially extensional, in the sense that it contains a canonical extensional
retract, which precludes intrinsic intensional phenomena [42]. In any case, the idea of promoting
semantical models into programming languages [92, 96] and studying semantical models of those
[14, 44] has been an effective methodological principle of categorical semantics from the outset. It
seems reasonable to look in that direction for an intrinsic view of intensional computation.
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7.2 Computability-as-programmability
Computable and uncomputable functions and processes are housed in the same category S. For
some observable computational effects M, and for all types A and B, we build some program
evaluators σAB ∈ S(A × P, B) and ϕAB ∈ SM(A × P, B). The partial evaluations of programs as
the elements of type P over a family of types X ∈ S, deemed computable, induce the indexed
programs S(X, P) ⊂ S(X, P). The unrestricted universal and partial evaluations of the X-indexed
programs induce the X-natural (polymorphic) program executions S(X, P) −→ SM(A × X, B × X),.
The surjective images S(X, P)։ SM(A × X, B × X) ⊂ SM(A × X, B× X) determine the computable
functions. They form a subcategory S ֒→ S, which carries the structure of a monoidal computer.
Its structure supports logic and arithmetic, program evolution, and complexity measurement and
limitations. It encodes any of the standard models of computation, much like they encode one
another. The difference is that categorical semantics displays computability as an intrinsic property,
in the sense of [9].
Many languages of logic claim universality, and establish their universality on their own terms.
E.g., set theory proves that it is the foundation of all mathematics, the first-order logic is the
language of structures and predicates, etc. The statement that logic is tasked with discovering
the universal laws of logic is a tautology, in a logic of logic. But a universal law should not be
misunderstood as the last word about anything, but as the first word about something else. The
idea that computability-as-programmability is a model-invariant, syntax-independent, device-free
concept, and a property intrinsic to all computable objects and processes, is broader than any
particular structure, albeit categorical, in which it may be expressed. The idea of computability-as-
programmability, in a suitable formulation, is the conceptual content of Kolmogorov’s invariance
theorem [60, Sec. 2.1]. Although recognizing a particular function as computable depends on en-
coding its computation in a particular model, as argued in [9], the invariance theorem implies that
the computability of the function is an intrinsic property nevertheless, because the encodings of
the function in the various models are not only computable but also programmable, and the pro-
gram transformations that perform the re-encodings between the models are of constant lengths.
Computability-as-programmability is not thus only testable by any of the equivalent models of
computation, as claimed by the Church-Turing thesis, but it is also quantifiable, in Kolmogorov’s
formulation by the length of programs, and the quantifications are equivalent, in the sense that the
differences between the encodings, taken over all unbounded program descriptions, are bounded
by a constant. Kolmogorov’s algorithmic complexity is thus the quantitative view of the intrin-
sic property of computability-as-programmability. By displaying programmability as a structure,
categorical semantics provides the qualitative view of this property.
It should be noted that qualitative and quantitative views of computation as processing of pro-
grams, descriptions, or information in general come about in disguise in many corners of science.
Although the search for programs that make a function computable-as-programmable is gener-
ally not a computable process, its average algorithmic complexity is an intrinsic quantity again:
the Shannon entropy [73, 108]. Information theory as the theory of information processing, has
thus been viewed as the theory of computation in microsystems, averaged out in thermodynam-
ics. Along the same lines, domain theory can also be viewed as an abstract theory of intrinsic
computability, this time factored out as approximation in suitable topologies [2, 98, Sec. 5.1]. A
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natural path ahead for categorical semantics could be to bring such conceptual threads together,
and close the loop.
8 Conclusion
In the propositions-as-types view, the extensional operations of abstraction and application, viz the
structure of cartesian closed categories, correspond to the introduction and the elimination of the
propositional implication:
(A ∧ X) ⊢ B
============ ⊃
X ⊢ (A ⊃ B)
S(A × X, B)
S
(
X, (A⇒B))
(A⇒−)◦ηX εX◦(A×−)
In process logics, the process implication introduction rule corresponds to the coinductive inter-
pretation of arbitrary states as process behaviors, captured in the final machine:
A ∧ X |ϕ−→^(B ∧ X)
~−
X |~ϕ−−−→ [A, B]^
SM(A × X, B × X)
S (X, [A, B]M)
~−X
In terms of dynamic types, computation corresponds to program execution. In terms of process
propositions, computability-as-programmability is thus an elimination rule, mapping programs, as
intensional proofs of the universal proposition, the programming language, into computations as
their extensions:
X | p−→P
{−}
A ∧ X | {p}−→^(B ∧ X)
S (X, P)
SM(A × X, B × X)
{−}
Categorical semantics provides convenient and sometimes effective tools for reasoning about types
and processes. Samson Abramsky led many of us through its vast landscape. I followed him to
the best of my ability. The present paper is an attempt at a travel report. But the territory is largely
uncharted, and there were times when I lost sight of Samson, probably somewhere far ahead. It is
thus likely that the travel report is not just about what I learned from Samson, but also about what I
misunderstood by getting lost, and maybe most of all about what I did not learn at all. Categorical
semantics of computational processes is a computational process itself, and it is the nature of such
processes that they may terminate, or not.
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Appendices
A Category R of sets and relations
Relations A←− R −→ B arise in two ways:
a) as subsets R
r
֌ A × B, so that
aRb ⇐⇒ ∃x ∈ X. a = rA(x) ∧ rB(x) = b
b) as a nondeterministic functions A
̺−→ ℘B and B ̺
o
−→ ℘A, so that
aRb ⇐⇒ ̺(a) ∋ b ⇐⇒ a ∈ ̺o(b)
where ℘ : S −→ S is the powerset monad.
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The equivalence between the two views lies at the heart of the elementary structure of topos [23,
35, 57], which can be defined in terms of the correspondece between the subsets R ֌ A × B and
the elements χR ∈ ℘(A × B), and the natural bijections
S(X × A,℘B)  S(X,℘(A × B))  S(X × B,℘A) (82)
A relational calculus can, however, be developed entirely in terms of subobjects R ֌ A × B, in
type universes without the powerset monad. Process relations are presented from this angle. The
universe S only needs to be regular [22, 76]. In addition to the cartesian structure, it is thus also
assumed to have the equalizers (i.e., the subsets characterized by equations), which induce the
pullback squares. The final assumption, crucial for the relational calculus, is that every function
f : A −→ B has an epi-mono (surjective-injective) factorization: it can be decomposed in the form
f =
(
A
e f
։ A′
m f
֌ B
)
, where e f ∈ E and m f ∈ M. The family E can be thought of as the quotient
maps (coequalizers), whereas M are all monics. The family E is required to be stable under the
pullbacks. The category of relations in S is then defined to be
|R| = |S| (83)
R(A, B) = M
/
(A × B)
whereM is the set of the equivalence classes modulo the relation
m  m′ ⇐⇒
R R′
X

m m′
Without this quotienting, R(A, B) would in general be a proper class. The composition of relations
A
R←→ B and B S←→ C, viewed as theM-monics R֌ A× B and S ֌ B×C, is defined using the
pullback R ×
B
S and the factorization in the following diagram.
R ×
B
S
R (R; S ) S
A B C
The identity A ←→ A in RS is the diagonal A −→ A × A in S. More general categories of
relations can be defined in more general situations using technically different but conceptually
similar constructions [76, 78]. If S has the coproducts +, they become biproducts in R. The
products × from S induce a canonical monoidal structure in R, with the compact structure η : 1↔
A↔ A × A and ε : A × A↔ A↔ 1 on every A [47].
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B Proof of Prop. 2.3.3
a) Suppose that S is a cartesian closed category with the exponents written (A⇒ B), and with an
initial FA-algebra
A +
(
A × A+) [ι,::]−−→ A+
The intuition is that A+ is the type of nonempty lists of elements of A, i.e. the free semigroup gen-
erated by A. The initial FA-algebra structure consists of the inclusion A
ι
֒→ A+, and the operation
A × A+ ::−→ which can be thought of as prepending a symbol a ∈ A to the list α ∈ A+, to construct
the list a :: α.
The final machine with the inputs from A and the outputs in B is in the form
[A, B] × A 〈ξ0,ξ1〉−−−−→ [A, B] × B (84)
where ξ0 is derived from prepending (::) and the closed structure by
[A, B] × A × A+ [A,B]×(::)−−−−−−→ [A, B] × A+ ε−→ B
[A, B] × A ξ0−→ [A, B]
whereas ξ1 is just the evaluation restricted along ι
[A, B] × A (ι⇒B)×A−−−−−→ (A⇒B) × A ε−→ B
[A, B] × A ξ1−→ B
To show that (84) is a final machine, note first that every machine X × A 〈x0 ,x1〉−−−−→ X × B induces an
FA-algebra over (X⇒B) by transposing
X ×
(
A +
(
A × (X⇒B))) κ˜−→ B
A +
(
A × (X⇒B)) κ−→ (X⇒B)
where κ˜ is the composite
X ×
(
A +
(
A × (X⇒B)))  (X × A) + (X × A × (X⇒B)) (X×A)+(x0×(X⇒B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
−→
(
X × A
)
+
(
X × (X⇒B)
)

(
X × A
)
+
(
(X⇒B) × B
) [x1 ,ε]−−−→ B
The FA-algebra κ now induces the catamorphism LκM, which induces the anamorphism ~x
A +
(
A × A+
)
A+ X × A X × B
A +
(
A × (X⇒B)
)
(X⇒B) [A, B] × A [A, B] × B
[ι,::]
A+(A×LκM) LκM
x
~x×A ~x×B
κ ξ
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by the tranposition
A+
LκM−→ (X⇒B)
X
~x−−→ [A, B]
The diagram chase showing that the commutativity and uniqueness of the catamorphism on the left
induce the commutativity and uniqueness of the anamorphism on the right is lengthy but straight-
forward.
b) The assumption is that S has final machines
[A, B] × A 〈ξ0,ξ1〉−−−−→ [A, B] × B
so that the machine [A, B]×A 〈π0,ξ1〉−−−−→ [A, B]× B induces the anamorphism π0, ξ1

, as displayed on
the following diagram.
[A, B] × A [A, B] × B
(A⇒B) × A (A⇒B) × B
[A, B] × A [A, B] × B
〈π0,ξ1〉
~π0,ξ1×A
q×A q×B
~π0,ξ1×B
〈π0,ε〉
m×A m×B
〈ξ0,ξ1〉
Since it is easy to see that

π0, ξ1

is an endomorphism on the machine [A, B]×A 〈π0,ξ1〉−−−−→ [A, B]×B,
the uniqueness of

π0, ξ1

as an anamorphism implies

π0, ξ1
 ◦ π0, ξ1

=

π0, ξ1

Using the assumption that the idempotents in S split, we now define the exponent (A⇒ B) as the
splitting [A, B]
q
։ (A⇒ B) m֌ [A, B] of π0, ξ1

. The morphism (A⇒ B) × A ε−→ B, induced
by the splitting in the above diagram, is the counit of the adjunction (−) × A ⊣ (A⇒−), for the
transposition operation λ from Table ?? defined
S(X × A, B) λ−→ S(X, (A⇒B))
f 7−→ λ f = q ◦ π0, f

To show that ε ◦ (λ f × A) = f holds, chase the following diagram:
X × A X × B
[A, B] × A [A, B] × B
(A⇒B) × A (A⇒B) × B
〈π0, f 〉
~π0, f×A
λ f×A
~π0, f×B
λ f×B〈π0,ξ1〉
q×A q×B
〈π0,ε〉

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C Proof sketch for Lemma 5.1
Since #A ≤ ℵ0, there is an ordinal number κ ≤ ω large enough to support an retraction P(A×A)֌
Pκ(A) ։ P(A× A), and thus also QAA1֌ QκA11։ QAA1 for the functor Q defined in (38). Hence
the tower of retractions:
1 QAA1 Q
2
AA1 Q
n
AA
1 [A, A]P
1 Qκ
A1
1 Qκ2
A1
1 Qκn
A1
1 [A, 1]P
! QAA!
m0
! Q
κ
A1
!
e0
The symmetry A × 1  1 × A lifts to a smilar retraction
[A, A]P
m1
֌ [1, A]P
e1
։ [A, A]P
With these retractions, the proof boils down to showing the commutativity of the following diagram
1 [A, A]P
[A, 1]P × [1, A]P
[A, A]P [A, A]P × [A, A]P
~id
~id
〈id,id〉
〈m0,m1〉
~−;− 〈e0 ,e1〉
~−;−
where ~−;− are the enriched compositions, constructed like in (25) (or see [51] for more details),
whereas ~id is the enriched identity, constructed as the anamorphism (final coalgebra homomor-
phism) from the identity machine A × 1 η−→ P(A × 1), where η is the unit of the monad P. This
diagram says that j = m0 ~id ∈ SP(A, 1) and r = m1 ~id ∈ SP(1, A) display A as a retract of 1 in
SP, i.e. that they compose to
idA =
(
A
j=m0~id−−−−−−→ 1 r=m1~id−−−−−−→ A
)
(85)

D Proof of Corollary 5.2
Since the embedding (58) is full and faithful by definition, we only need to prove that it is essen-
tially surjective: for an arbitrary object S ∈ DProc≤ℵ0 we must find S ′ ∈ dProc such that S  S ′ in
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DProc≤ℵ0 . An object of DProc≤ℵ0 is a dynamic relation A
S←→ 1 in SP, where #A ≤ ℵ0. An object
of dProc is a hyperset S ′, viewed as a dynamic relation 1
S ′←→ 1 in SP. By Lemma 5.1, there are
the relations j ∈ SP(A, 1) and r ∈ SP(1, A) such that ( j; r) = idA. Setting
S ′ =
(
1
r←→ A S←→ 1
)
assures that the inner triangle in the following diagram commutes.
1 A
1
S ′
r
S
j
The outer triangle commutes because S ′ ◦ j = S ◦ r ◦ j = S by (85). So we have the morphisms
r ∈ DProc≤ℵ0(S ′, S ) and j ∈ DProc≤ℵ0(S , S ′). They form an isomorphism because r ◦ j = idS
by (85) again, and j ◦ r ∈ DProc≤ℵ0(S ′, S ′) must be an identity because S ′ is a subobject of the
terminal object in DProc≤ℵ0 . 
E Traces and the Int-construction
The trace operation on a symmetric (or braided) monoidal category (C,⊗, I) is typed by the rule
A ⊗ Y f−→ B ⊗ Y
A
TrY ( f )−−−−→ B
The equations for this operation, with some examples and explanations can be found in [6, 46, 83].
The free compact category over any traced monoidal C
|IntC| = |C|− × |C|+ (86)
IntC(A, B) = C (A− ⊗ B+, B− ⊗ A+)
where X− = {−} × X and X+ = {+} × X. The composition of IntC(A, B) × IntC(B,C) •−→ C(A,C) is
defined by
A− ⊗ B+
f−−→ B− ⊗ A+ B− ⊗ C+
g−→ C− ⊗ B+
A− ⊗ C+ ⊗ B− ⊗ B+
σ
 A− ⊗ B+ ⊗ B− ⊗C+
f⊗g−−−→ B− ⊗ A+ ⊗ C− ⊗ B+
σ
 C− ⊗ A+ ⊗ B− ⊗ B+
g • f =
(
A− ⊗ C+
TrB−⊗B+ (σ◦(g⊗ f )◦σ)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ C− ⊗ A+
)
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F The extended reals as alternating dyadics
Recall from Sec. 6.3.1 that R = R∪{∞,−∞} is the extended real continuum, and that Σ⊛ =∐ω+1i=0 Σi
is the set of finite or infinite (countable) strings of symbols from Σ = {−,+}, which are treated in
(87) as {−1, 1}.
Define the value of the function Φ : Σ⊛ −→ R on an arbitrary string ς = ( ς0 ς1 ς2, . . . ) to be
Φ(ς) = z · ς0 +
∞∑
i=z+1
ςi
2i−z
(87)
where z = µn. ςn , ςn+1 is the length of the initial segment before the sign flips. If ς is the infinite
string of either one sign or the other, then z is infinite, and the value of Φ(ς) is either ∞ or −∞.
Leaving the two infinities aside, Φ establishes a bijection between the remaining Σ-stings, where
the sign eventually flips, and the finite real numbers from R. For an arbitrary x ∈ R, the string
ξ ∈ Σ⊛ such that x = Φ(ξ) can be constructed as follows:
• Decompose the real line as the disjoint union of the closed-open and open-closed intervals
R =
∞∐
n=1
[−n,−n + 1) + {0} +
∞∐
n=1
(n − 1, n]
leaving the 0 on its own. Then there are 3 cases:
• (0) If x = 0 then ξ is the empty string ().
• (-) If x ∈ [−n0,−n0 + 1), then ξ begins with − − · · · −︸    ︷︷    ︸
n0
.
• (+) If x ∈ [n0 − 1, n0), then ξ begins with + + · · ·+︸    ︷︷    ︸
n0
.
• In case (-), find
– the smallest n1 such that x ≤ −n0 +
∑n1
i=1
1
2i
and append + · · ·+︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
to ξ;
– the smallest n2 such that x ≥ −n0 +
∑n1
i=1
1
2i
−∑n2
i=1
1
2n1+i
and append − · · · −︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
to ξ;
– the smallest n3 such that x ≤ · · · , etc.
• In case (+), find
– the smallest n1 such that x ≥ n0 −
∑n1
i=1
1
2i
and append − · · · −︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
to ξ;
– the smallest n2 such that x ≤ · · · , etc.
• If you ever reach a sum equal to x, then halt and leave ξ finite. Otherwise ξ is infinite.
In any case, it is easy to see that Φ(ξ) = x and that Φ(ξ) = Φ(ζ) implies ξ = ζ. So Φ is an injection.
And we have just shown that it is a surjection by constructing for an arbitrary x ∈ R a ξ ∈ Σ⊛ such
that x = Φ(ξ). The function Φ defined by (87) is thus the claimed bijection.
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